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I. INTRODUCTION
The important natural and cultural values of virtually every 
unit of the National Park System are threatened by proposed 
activities on public and private lands beyond park boundaries.
E.q., National Park Service, Dept, of the Interior, State of the 
Parks 1980: A Report to Congress (May, 1980) (State of the
Parks); Cahn, Islands in a Storm: Our National Parks (Five-part
series in the Christian Science Monitor beginning June 14, 1982, 
reprinted in Oversight on the Current State of the National Park 
System Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and National Parks 
of the House Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 856-74 (1982). These "threats" include, inter alia, 
power plants, mining operations, timbering, road and utility 
corridor development, and subdivision construction. Id.
The Park Service has ample authority to protect the parks 
from incompatible development on federal lands under its organic 
act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq., and the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., and from develop­
ment on non-federal lands under the organic act when read 
together with the Constitution's Commerce Clause,
U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and Property
Clause. U.S. Const, art IV, § 3, cl. 2 and the cases interpreting 
these constitutional provisions.
The crux of the problem is to develop an effective 
(politically realistic and economically sound) mechanism to 
ensure that the Park Service can protect the parks from external
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development which poses a significant threat to park values and 
would impair the visitor experience. A recent study by the 
Conservation Foundation points out:
...available tools are often 
insufficient to protect the parks. The Park 
Service concedes that "external threats, 
though generally the most serious, are 
receiving little attention...because they are 
considered more complex and much more 
difficult to deal with." The serious impacts 
of projects outside the parks indicate that 
more must be done.
Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New 
Generation— Visions, Realities, Prospects 143 (1985) 
(Footnote ommitted).
Available tools are, indeed, inadequate to protect the parks 
from external development, as the Conservation Foundation 
suggests, but not because the Park Service does not have the 
authority to protect the parks, but because of a lack of imagina­
tion and aggressive stewardship on the part of the Park Service 
in the face of hostility from other entities. When a unit of the 
National Park system is threatened by external development, the 
Park Service must explore and develop alternatives to the 
proposal which could fulfill the needs the project is designed to 
meet without threatening park values. Practically, this is the 
only way to ensure that electric generation, mineral extraction^ 
or high-level nuclear waste storage, which are almost always 
touted as essential to the national interest and critical to the 
local economy, will not override conflicting park values, for 
example, based upon aesthetics, recreation or solitude. More­
over, to the extent this approach is linked to economic efficien-
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CY' ^  could minimize the pitfalls, failures, and increasing 
hostility, especially in the western states, to government 
control and regulation. After all, who can argue with protecting 
our parks and at the same time using our natural resources in the 
most economically efficient way? Many park-threatening activi­
ties are not the most efficient economically, but rather the 
result of historic business patterns, subsidies, and long-stand­
ing, but no longer appropriate governmental preferences which 
continue, for the most part, because of inertia. The most 
effective way to change government and private sector inertia is 
to force these entities to take a look at other ways of doing 
business by considering alternatives. This would include a fair 
financial comparison between the proponent's project and feasible 
alternatives.
Since most park-threatening development is capital inten­
sive, such as power plants and large dams, alternatives such as 
conservation and increased efficiency will not only be more 
benign environmentally, but, for the most part, economically 
superior based on both private investment criteria and public 
resource utilization. This is particularly true when externali­
ties, i.e., degradation of natural resources not captured in the 
market, are taken into consideration, and the enormous economic 
benefits derived from tourism in the parks are included in the 
analysis.
In those few cases where the economics of a park-threatening 
project may be superior to the alternatives, the limited govern­
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ment and private money earmarked for park protection could be 
allocated to recapture leases, purchase non-federal land or 
development rights. This approach recognizes that people are 
willing to pay to protect the natural and cultural values of the 
parks. Of course, under certain circumstances if a proposed 
project would substantially harm park values and impair the 
visitor experience, to the extent it could be called a nuisance, 
compensation may not be necessary.
This proposal, relying on the use of the market, for the 
most part, to protect the parks, is similar to proposed reforms 
in allocating western water rights. See S. Williams, A Market- 
Based Approach to Water Rights: Evaluating Colorado's Water 
System, in Tradition, Innovation, and Conflict: Perspectives on 
Colorado Water Law (to be published by the Natural Resources Law 
Center, University of Colorado Law School— Fall 1986). Judge 
Williams' suggestions for protecting instream uses, including 
"the aesthetic contribution of water flowing freely in a stream" 
is directly applicable to protecting the natural and cultural 
values of the parks.
The first step in this process is to determine the signifi­
cant natural and/or cultural values a park is intended to protect 
in order to evaluate whether a proposal may jeopardize a park and 
impair the visitor experience. Many of the statutes and proclam­
ations establishing the parks contain information which will be 
useful in establishing these values. Moreover, numerous publica­
tions by the Park Service and others provide detailed information
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on the significant natural and cultural values of each park.
Alternatives to a project which could harm park values would 
then be explored. For example, as an alternative to a large 
power plant, conservation, cogeneration, and small-hydro, could 
be considered in combination.
The Park Service has recognized the need to develop this 
kind of approach:
The National Park Service cannot remain 
on the sidelines and expect to reject a 
proposed project merely because it poses a 
potential threat to park resources or park 
values. As Federal Land Managers, we must be 
prepared to identify viable alternatives in 
those situations where proposed development 
activity would damage the park.
State of the Parks, supra at 35.
Professor Sax has also suggested this type of approach in his 
analysis of the internal management practices of the Park 
Service:
If the goal is to encourage contem­
plative recreation in the parks, the way to 
do it is diligently to look for ways to meet 
other recreational demands more effectively 
at existing sites, and to scrutinize more 
carefully claims of need and demand. The 
strategy is to increase the burden that there 
is no alternative except the use of the 
parklands....
J. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on
the National Parks 66-67 (1980). (emphasis added).
There are historical precedents which demonstrate the 
importance of developing and promoting alternatives to avoid harm 
to the parks. Mastbaum, No Park is An Island: A Simple Solution
for the Thorny Problem of Park Protection (see Appendix A). The
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efforts of the Park Service to develop alternatives to the 
logging of Sitka spruce in Olympic National Park during World 
War II are described in National Psi,; Service War Work (Dec. 7, 
1941 to June 30, 1944), relevant portions of which are found in 
Appendix B. The alternative scenario developed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund to protect Bryce and Zion National 
Parks from the massive Allen-Warner Valley Energy Project is set 
out in Appendix C.
A clearly defined requirement to consider alternatives when 
important park values are threatened, hopefully, would lead to 
increased cooperation between the Park Service and other federal 
agencies, state and local governments, and commercial interests. 
These entities could jointly seek alternatives that would meet 
the needs the park-threatening development was intended to 
satisfy, while avoiding harm to the parks. This type of coopera­
tion is virtually nonexistent today, given competing and con­
flicting responsibilities and goals. See, e.g., Keiter, On 
Protecting the National Parks From the External Threats Dilemma, 
20 Land and Water L. Rev. 355, 394 n. 233 (1985).
As stated above, the obligation of the Park Service to 
consider alternatives should not be limited to development on 
federal lands or activity subject to a federal license or permit, 
but also development on state or private land. In the latter 
case, alternatives could include: 1) land exchanges; 2) zoning;
3) purchase; 4) purchase of development rights; 5) condemnation; 
and 6) nuisance-type litigation.
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While the Park Service has ample legal authority, indeed the 
responsibility, to adopt a program to consider alternatives to 
park-threatening development, political realities suggest the 
need for legislation that requires the program suggested.
The following areas are discussed below: 1) the authority
and responsibility of the Park Service under its organic act; 2) 
establishing the significant natural and cultural values a park 
is intended to protect; 3) consideration of alternatives under 
the National Environmental Policy Act; and, 4) the authority of 
the Park Service under its organic act when read together with 
the Constitution's Property and Commerce clauses to protect parks 
from external development on non-federal lands.
II. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ORGANIC ACT
The organic act which establishes the National Park Service 
and National Park System provides the framework for management 
and protection of the system. It directs the Park Service to 
administer the parks:
...by such means and measures as conform 
to the fundamental purpose of said parks, 
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is 
to conserve the scenery and the national and 
historic objects and the wildlife therein and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in 
such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations.
16 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
A House Report on the 1916 act states that the primary 
purpose of the park service bill is to preserve "nature as it 
exists." H.R. Rep. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
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A 1978 amendment to the organic act reaffirms the authority
and duty of the Park Service to protect the national park
system. It provides, in part, that:
...The authorization of activities shall 
be construed and the protection, management, 
and administration of these areas shall be 
conducted in light of the high public value 
and integrity of the National Park System and 
shall not be exercised in derogation of the 
values and purposes for which these areas 
have been established....
16 U.S.C. § la-1.
The Senate Report on the 1978 amendment emphasizes that:
The Secretary [of the Interior] has an 
absolute duty, which is not to be compro­
mised, to fulfill the mandate of the 1916 Act 
to take whatever actions and seek whatever 
relief as will safeguard the units of the 
National Park System.
Senate Report 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 
(Oct. 21, 1977) (emphasis added).
In the National Rifle Association v. Potter, 628 
F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986), the court, in upholding regulations 
prohibiting hunting and trapping within units of the National 
Park System, quoted from a memorandum by former Secretary of the 
Interior Work, which it found to be a contemporaneous interpreta­
tion of the organic act entitled to "considerable deference":
...[t]he duty imposed upon the National 
Park Service in the organic act creating it 
to faithfully preserve the parks and monu­
ments for posterity in essentially their 
natural state is paramount to every other 
activity."
Id. at 910.
The organic act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
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make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem 
necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks." 16 
U.S.C. § 3.
In the litigation concerning the protection of Redwood 
National Park, the court held that the organic act and the 
Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 79a et_ seg., required the 
Secretary of the Interior to take affirmative actions to protect 
Redwood National Park from logging on adjacent land which was 
endangering the trees the park was created to protect. Sierra 
Club y. Department of the Interior, Id. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The 
court's decision appears to be based upon both statutory obliga­
tions and a trust responsibility. 376 F. Supp. at 95. ("In view 
of the analogous trust responsibility of the Secretary of the 
Interior with respect to public lands...and the... specific set of 
objectives which the provisions of the Redwood National Park Act 
were designed to accomplish...").
In a later opinion in this litigation, the court held that 
the federal "defendants unreasonably, arbitrarily, and in abuse 
of discretion have failed to exercise and perform duties imposed" 
by "the organic act and Redwood National Park Act." 398 
F. Supp. 284, 293 (1975). However, after the Secretary had 
requested, inter alia, funds from the Office of Management and 
Budget to purchase adjacent land, legislative action to regulate 
private actions beyond park boundaries and the Justice Department 
to sue the timber companies, he had met his duty to protect the 
park and it was up to Congress to provide sufficient funds for
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park protection. 424 F. Supp. 172 (1976).
In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), 
the court recognized that the organic act and its 1978 amendment 
require the Secretary to protect park resources from activities 
beyond park boundaries. If water development activities outside 
of park boundaries were:
...a real and immediate water supply 
threat to the scenic, natural, historic or 
biotic resource values of Glen Canyon 
National recreation Area or Grand Canyon 
National Park, the Secretary must take 
appropriate action.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the court concluded that while the Secretary had 
broad discretion concerning the discharge of his park protection 
duties, the discretion was not unlimited. Id. Finally, the 
court found the Secretary's obligation to protect the parks was 
statutory and to the extent the Redwood National Park decisions 
suggested or found an independent trust obligation, the Andrus 
court disagreed. The practical distinction between a statutory 
and trust obligation to protect the parks from external develop­
ment, however, is not clear at this point.
However, it is clear from the organic act, its legislative 
history, and court decisions interpreting it, that the Park 
Service has the authority and responsibility to protect units of 
the National Park System from incompatible external development 
which threatens important park values.
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III. PARK VALUES
The natural and cultural values a park was set aside to 
protect can be determined from the enabling legislation, presi­
dential proclamation, or from numerous descriptive materials 
prepared by the Park Service and others.
Units of the national park system can be created by specific 
legislation, se_e, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 21 (Yellowstone), 16 U.S.C. § 
201 (Grand Canyon), 16 U.S.C. § 401 (Bryce Canyon), or by 
presidential proclamation. 16 U.S.C. § 431. These acts and 
proclamations may contain a statement of purpose concerning the 
significant natural and cultural values the park was set aside to 
protect. This information can be important when a park is 
threatened, to demonstrate the adverse effects on park values and 
the visitor experience.
For example, North Cascades National Park was established 
"[i]n order to preserve for the benefit, use, and inspiration of 
present and future generations certain majestic mountain scenery, 
snow fields, glaciers, alpine meadows, and other unique natural 
features...." 16 U.S.C. § 90. And Canyonlands National Park was 
established "[i]n order to preserve an area in the State of Utah 
possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and archeologic 
features for the inspiration, benefit and use of the public...." 
16 U.S.C. § 271.
Since many of the enabling statutes do not contain detailed 
information on park values, it may be necessary to resort to the 
large body of literature that exists, prepared by the Park
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Service and others, describing the important natural and cultural
values of the parks. E.g.: National Park Service, Dept, of the
Interior, National Park Portfolio (6th ed. 1931); F. Tilden, The 
National Parks (3rd rev. ed. 1986) (ed. by P. Schullery); Sierra 
Club, Guides to the National Parks, Rocky Mountains and the Great 
Plains (1984); Desert Southwest (1984); Pacific Southwest and 
Hawaii (1984); and, Pacific Northwest and Alaska (1985);
A. Haines, Yellowstone National Park— Its Exploration and 
Establishment (1984) (prepared for National Park Service).
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 
commands all federal agencies to: "[ijnclude in every recommenda­
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by responsible officials 
on...(iii) alternatives to the proposed action.... (42 U.S.C. § 
4332(c)(iii).)
NEPA also requires federal agencies to "study, develop and 
describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of 
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts 
concerning alternative uses of available resources." (Id. § 4332 
(E).)
Section 4332(E) is not limited to "major federal actions" as 
is § 4332(c). E.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-36 
(2d Cir. 1972), cert, denied. 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
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..."supplemental to and more extensive 
in its commands" than is, section 
102(2)(c)(iii) [42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iii)], 
particularly as it requires not only the 
study and description of appropriate alter­
natives, but also that they be "developed."
This directive imports not mere lip service 
to and discussion of alternatives; it 
presumes a degree of serious consideration, 
perhaps some preliminary research, contin­
gency planning, and the assignment of 
personnel and equipment to pursue the 
possibilities. Section 1020(E) [42 U.S.C. §
4332(E)] may require a discussion of alter­
natives not only in greater depth, but also 
in wider range, perhaps including an indica­
tion of the "optimum" use of the resources at 
state.
W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 724 (1977) (citations 
omitted).
The regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) provide that:
Each agency shall be capable (in terms 
of personnel and other resources) of com­
plying with the requirements enumerated 
below. Such compliance may include use of 
other resources, but the using agency shall 
itself have sufficient capability to evaluate 
what others do for it. Agencies shall
*  *  *
(d) Study, develop, and describe alternatives 
to recommended courses of action in any 
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts 
concerning alternative uses of available 
resources. This requirement of section 
102(2)(E ) [42 U.S.C. § 4332(E)] extends to
all such proposals, not just the more limited 
scope of section 102(2)(c)(iii) [42 U.S.C. §
4332(2) (c) (iii) ]» where the discussion of 
alternatives is confined to impact 
statements.
40 C.F.R. § 1507.2(d).
Professor Rodgers states § 4332(E) is:
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When park values are threatened by proposed development on 
federal land or by activities which require a federal license or 
permit, other responsible federal agencies, as well as the Park 
Service, must consider and develop alternatives to the proposal. 
The CEQ regulations provide detailed directions on considering 
alternatives and resolution of conflicts between federal agencies 
on environmentally unsatisfactory proposals. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 
1501.6, 1502.14, 1503.4, part 1504, 1505.2(b). The obligation of 
federal agencies to consider alternatives to proposed agency 
actions and the scope of that obligation are discussed in, inter 
alia:
1) Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA; Toward 
an Accommodation, 3 Ecol. L. Q. 705 (1973);
2) Picher, Alternatives Under NEPA: The
Function of Objectives in an Environmental 
Impact Statement, 11 Harv. J. on Legis. 595 
(1974).
3) Comment, The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969: What "Alternatives Must an
Agency Discuss?, 12 Colum. J. L. &
Soc. Probs. 221 (1976);
4) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
435 U.S. 519 (1978);
5) Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 
88 (2d Cir. 1975); and,
6) City of New York v. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), 
see also the district court's opinion in this 
case which was reversed by the Second Circuit 
on other grounds. 539 F. Supp. 1237, 1276- 81.
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO PROTECT PARKS FROM ACTIVITIES ON
PRIVATE LANDS
The National Park Service has broad powers under its organic 
act when read together with the Constitution's Commerce Clause, 
U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and Property Clause,
U.S. Const, art IV, § 3, cl. 2, to protect parks from development 
on non-federal lands which threatens important natural and 
cultural values of units of the National Park System. See, e.g., 
Frank and Eckhardt, Power of Congress Under the Property Clause 
to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law: Will
"Respecting Property” Go the Way of "Affecting Commerce"? XV 
Nat. Res. Lawyer 663 (1983); Gaethe, The Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area— Wilderness Act of 1978; Regulating Non-Federal Property 
Under the Property Clause, 60 Ore. L. Rev. 157 (1981); L. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law 232-44 (1978); Sax, Helpless Giants: 
The National Parks and Regulation of Private Lands, 75 
Mich. L. Rev. 239 (1977); Knight v. United Land Association, 142 
U.S. 161 (1891); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States 
v. County Board of Arlington, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E. D. Va. 1979).
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (468 
U.S. 288 (1984)), the court recognized that the "network of 
National Parks...are unique resources that the Federal Government 
holds in trust for the American people," id. at 290, and "the 
Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
National Parks are adequately protected." ic3. at 297.
Activities on private land within park boundaries
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(inholdings) which threaten park values are subject to regulation 
by the Park Service. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th 
Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). There is no 
reason to distinguish between activities on private land, 
whether within or without park boundaries, that threaten 
essential park values. When park-threatening activities are 
proposed for non-federal land, the Park Service should consider, 
inter alia: 1) land exchanges; 2) zoning; 3) purchase; 4)
purchase of development rights; 5) condemnation; and 6) nuisance- 
type litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of alternatives, as a means to protect the parks 
from incompatible external development, as suggested above, is 
within the authority of the Park Service. However, because of 
the pressure applied on the Park Service by other federal 
agencies, state and local governments, private development 
interests, and politicians, Congress should adopt a clear 
legislative program that would force consideration of alter­
natives when important natural and cultural values of a park are 
potentially jeopardized. To the extent this approach relies on 
economic efficiency, as opposed to government control, it avoids, 
or at least minimizes the hostility towards regulation, 
especially in the the western states.
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No Park is An Island: A Simple 




David Mastbaum is an attorney practicing in Boulder, 
Colorado. He is a graduate o f the University of Michigan 
Law School. He was lead counsel for the Environmental 
Defense Fund in the Allen-Warner Valley proceeding, 
involving the construction of a large proposed energy 
project near Bryce and Zion National Parks. He also 
represents the environmental iptervenors in the Juniper- 
Cross Mountain case before the Federal Energy Regu­
latory Commission, which involves the construction of two 
dams on the Yampa River above Dinosaur National 
Monument. He has climbed, skied, run, and walked in most 
of the western National Parks. Mr. Mastbaum was a fellow at 
the Natural Resources Law Center during the spring 
semester, 1986.
"Simplification of Means and
Elevation of Ends is the Goal"
- Henry David Thoreau
The year 1864 was a particularly savage one in the 
fratricidal conflict between the federal government and the 
confederate states. In May alone, during the battles of the 
"Wilderness" and "Spotsylvania Courthouse," Grant lost 
over 36,000 soldiers and Lee’s losses exceeded 17,000. 
It was during this year, also, that President Lincoln signed 
into law a bill ceding to California, for use as a park only, and 
for all time, the ‘"cleft' in the Granite Peak of the Sierra 
Nevada," the incomparable valley—Yosemite— and the 
nearby Mariposa Big Trees, the magnificent Sequoia- 
dendron Gigantea. This legislation, passed and signed at 
the height of Civil War misery and brutality, was the seminal 
point in the eventual birth of the national park system, 
which Joe Sax of Michigan Law School calls one of "the 
few unambiguous triumphs of American public policy," and 
Wallace Stegner, the respected historian, writer, and 
conservationist, simply calls "the best idea we ever had.”
Evolution of the National Park Idea
The Yosemite bill was the first time federal land had been 
dedicated to a non-utilitarian purpose. It marked the 
beginning of a change in the notion, which had been the 
cornerstone of American public land policy up to that time, 
that nature should be subdued and used, to the idea that it 
should be respected, indeed preserved. This trans­
formation, probably, had its roots in the writings of the 
famous early nineteenth-century traveler and painter of 
American Indians, George Catlin, and the great trans­
cendental philosophers of New England, Thoreau and 
Emerson.
The thrust of the 1864 Yosemite legislation—America's 
unique natural wonders required special protection if they 
were to be enjoyed by future generations—was formally 
translated into the national park idea with the creation of 
Yellowstone National Park a few years later in 1872. 
Setting aside an area larger than Rhode Island and 
Delaware combined, "as a public park or pleasuring ground
A PpeW Di/ d .
for the benefit and enjoyment of the people," and placing 
its enormous natural resource potential off limits to private 
resource development interests was a dramatic step. 
However, Yellowstone, like all of the early national parks of 
the West, was an island in the vast American wilderness 
and because of the great abundance of land, commercial 
interests did not feel threatened. Indeed, certain business 
interests, such as the railroads, became major supporters 
of the parks, providing not only access, but also offering a 
wide variety of services for tourists.
"The Loch" —  Rocky Mountain N.P., CO. Photo by Bill Sontag.
The national park idea was a success. Newspapers and 
magazines, caught up in the uniqueness and romance of 
creating great outdoor museums, supported the parks 
strongly and often. People flocked to the parks and 
western politicians pushed for new parks to be estab­
lished.
By 1916, eighteen parks existed and Congress and the 
President recognized the need to establish a compre­
hensive and systematic protection scheme. The National 
Park System Organic Act was adopted and a National Park 
Service was created to manage the parks "in such manner 
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations."
The first Park Service Director, the charismatic and 
indefatigable Steven Mather was a master of the public 
relations game, and he made certain the word got out 
about these parks. He achieved his goal, probably beyond 
his wildest expectations. Visitor increases, especially with 
the coming of the automobile and its new highway system 
were staggering.
Today the system has over 330 units, a potpourri of 
America's natural and cultural heritage—from the great 
natural parks, to the historical parks, to the very popular 
urban recreation areas. This amounts to nearly 80 million 
acres—one percent of the land in the continental United 
States and fourteen percent of Alaska. In 1985, these 
parks had over 250 million recreation visits.
Managing and Protecting the Parks
Despite this enormous popularity, indeed, in part be­
cause of it, all is not well with the parks. Severe over­
crowding at some parks, along with pressure from political 
and commercial interests to take advantage of the 
bonanza, means that crucial internal management policies, 
about the type of recreational experience that the parks will 
offer, must be shaped. Matters that require attention
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include limitations on the number of visitors, entrance and 
user fees, determining how much of the park system 
should remain as wilderness or primitive areas, and the 
type of facilities that should be made available.
Park decision-makers are being forced to shape the 
future of these great enclaves with a shrinking budget, 
despite increased visitation, and in a political arena where 
the major actors seem genuinely confused about park 
management, given the tension between their conven­
tional political wisdom of less government and the obvious 
need to protect the crown jewels of America's public lands. 
Joe Sax, in his thoughtful book, "Mountains Without 
Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks," tackles the 
internal management quagmire well. While one may 
disagree with Sax's rendition of why the parks were 
created and for whom, he has proffered sensible solutions 
designed to restore and preserve the parks. These 
solutions don't require a lot of money, but an awareness 
that in visiting a national park, one should ”[p]ut aside the 
plastic alligators of the amusement park" and focus on 
nature, which "taken on its own terms, has something to 
say that will you will be glad to hear."
External Threats to the Parks
The greatest challenge to the national parks system, 
however, is not correcting the course of internal man­
agement policies, but incompatible development beyond 
park boundaries. Examples of external park-threatening 
activities can be found throughout the system. 
Yellowstone's famous geysers are threatened by 
proposed geothermal development. The critical habitat of 
its endangered grizzly bears is threatened by oil and gas 
exploration and development. The burgeoning demand 
for domestic, commercial, and agricultural water in south 
Florida has impaired the natural flow into Everglades 
National Park, endangering the park's fauna and flora. Oil, 
gas, and coal exploration and timbering are threatening 
Glacier's bears and elk by jeopardizing habitat. At Dinosaur 
National Monument, which straddles the Colorado-Utah 
border, proposed dams would reduce and alter stream flow 
endangering riparian plants and wildlife.
The thorny problem of external threats raises as many 
issues as does attempted reform in that arcane kingdom 
known as western water. While the Constitution's 
Commerce and Property clauses, the Organic Act of the 
Park Service, and the specific legislation required to create 
a national park all suggest that the Secretary of the Interior 
has an affirmative obligation to protect the parks from 
threatening development on adjacent lands, in practice 
the too-general commands in these laws do not provide 
sufficient muscle for a well-meaning, but weak and weary 
Park Service.
Moreover, other federal, state, and local environmental 
and land use laws, while establishing general standards, 
do not take account of the special natural and cultural 
values for which the parks were created, and therefore fail 
to protect them. Finally, and perhaps the crux of the 
problem, cooperation between the National Park Service, 
other federal agencies, and state and local governments 
with regard to park protection is difficult, at best, given the 
competing and at times conflicting responsibilities and 
goals of these entities. For example, the Department of 
Energy viewed Park Service concerns about the proposed 
siting of the high-level radioactive waste dump, a stone's 
throw away from Canyonlands National Park in south­
eastern Utah, as the ravings of a single-purpose agency 
with little or no understanding of a serious national 
dilemma.
The problem of incompatible development beyond park 
boundaries is one of relatively recent vintage. During most 
of the first one hundred years of their existence, the 
national parks were protected, for the most part, from 
external development by their isolation. However, be­
ginning in the 1970s the natural buffers around the parks 
rapidly began to disintegrate with increased demand for 
timber, minerals, hydrocarbon fuels; and urban en­
croachment. In addition, air quality degradation in and 
around some parks from a combination of old and new air 
pollution sources, some of which are situated hundreds of 
miles from any park, creates an administrative nightmare 
with all of the accompanying technical difficulties, political 
sensitivities, and economic consequences.
The Saga of the Kaiparowits Plateau
The enormous vulnerability of the parks to development 
beyond their borders and the ephemeral nature of their de 
facto buffers was dramatically brought to the country's 
attention in the isolated desert country of south-central 
Utah in the early 1970s. In 1972, then Secretary of the 
Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, announced a plan to build 
enough new power plants in the Southwest to produce an 
additional thirty thousand megawatts of capacity. The 
flagship of this scheme, the Kaiparowits project, was 
originally planned as a mine-mouth, five-thousand mega­
watt (later reduced to three thousand megawatts), coal- 
fired plant. It would have been been the largest single 
power plant ever built. The project was to be financed 
primarily by California utilities, to whom most of the energy 
would go.
The proposed project site was within a 250-mile radius of 
the "Golden Circle” of southwestern desert parks—at the 
time comprising more than 25 percent of the country's 
national park land. This area contains some of the most 
majestic and unusual desert landscape in the world. The 
local people, county and municipal governments, and the 
State of Utah strongly supported the project because they 
saw it as a panacea for a depressed economy with chronic 
unemployment. However, air pollution from the project 
would have significantly reduced the magnificent vistas in 
this mysterious land of red rocks, deep blue sky, intricate 
carved canyons, and bizarre rock formations—land set 
aside as national parks for all the people.
Primarily because of increasing construction costs, 
reduced demand for energy in California, and strong public 
support for park protection (especially after Robert Redford 
appeared on Sixty Minutes to discuss what the Kaiparowits 
project would do to the "Golden Circle” of parks), the 
utilities abandoned the project in 1976. Even after 
Kaiparowits was scrapped, however, and despite numer­
ous studies which established that very few jobs would be 
created directly for local people because of the skills 
required, and that tourism was the best hope for the 
economy of southern Utah, local support for massive 
energy development remained high, with a symbolic 
environmentalist, Robert Redford, being burned in effigy 
in Kanab, Utah.
The Kaiparowits controversy should have triggered an 
awareness of the need for a systemwide Park Service 
strategy to ensure that the parks would be protected from 
external threats. The problems of protecting national parks
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from development beyond their borders were focused 
sharply—a project offered in the national interest which 
would impair essential park values, conflict between the 
Park Service and other pro-development federal agencies, 
and strong local support for the project. However, the 
death of the project and the election of Jimmy Carter, 
perceived to be pro-park and pro-environment, lulled 
people to sleep.
Redwood National Park: Designed to Fail
The mid-1970s also saw an intense struggle to save 
Redwood National Park from the effects of logging 
operations on adjacent lands, which were causing severe 
erosion and stream sedimentation and, thereby, 
threatening to destroy the veiy trees the park was 
intended to protect. Redwood National Park was created in 
1968. The political compromises surrounding the estab­
lishment of the park's boundaries ignored ecological 
principles, particularly the need for watershed protection 
necessary for the survival of the giant trees. Unlike most of 
the other great national parks in the West, which were 
created long before adjacent development posed a 
problem, Redwood's boundaries were drawn to ensure 
that logging would continue unabated on abutting lands 
which also ensured that the Park would fail.
The responsibility and authority of the Secretary of the 
Interior to protect Redwoods was litigated and, in a series 
of three somewhat confusing court decisions, that 
responsibility and authority were established. However, 
despite the mandatory duty of the Secretary to protect the 
park from external threats, the Interior Department lacked 
sufficient funds to purchase adjacent lands—the only 
realistic solution—and the court found the Secretary had 
done all that he could. The ball was now passed to 
Congress.
Congress did act in 1978 and authorized additional 
funds to protect and rehabilitate the Park. Congress also 
realized, at the time, that parks were vulnerable to in­
creasing development beyond their boundaries and 
amended the Park Service Organic Act. It added vague 
and general language about the "high public value" of the 
park system and the need to manage the system to protect 
"the values and purposes for which these areas have been 
established."
Unfortunately, this rhetoric, like the 1916 statute, while 
well-meaning and establishing good policy objectives, 
neither provides the specificity nor creates the non- 
discretionary duty which would ensure that the Park 
Service, in the face of strong opposition from other federal 
agencies, local governments, and commercial interests 
(whose projects are often touted as essential to the 
national interest) can meet its obligation to protect the 
parks.
Allen-Warner Valley—Parks vs. Energy
The conflict between park values and development on 
adjacent land took center stage in the late 1970s. A mas­
sive energy project, identified by its proponents as es­
sential to the national interest, was pitted against the 
esthetic and recreational values of two very popular 
national parks.
The Allen-Warner Valley Energy system called for two 
coal-fired power plants (one only 17 miles upwind from 
Zion National Park) with a combined capacity of 2500 
megawatts, a large strip mine virtually abutting Bryce
Bryce Canyon N.P., Utah. Photo by Bill Son tag.
Canyon and only about three miles from its scenic Yovimpa 
Point overlook, hundreds of miles of pipeline to transport 
the coal (in semi-liquid form) from the mine to the power 
plants, a dam, and reservoir. This cumbersome proposal 
was the kind of outlandishly complicated stuff that 
technological satirist Rube Goldberg's cartoon character, 
Professor Lucifer Gorgonzola Butts, might have con­
cocted.
The absurd and unnecessary complexity of the project, 
however, was not the real problem. Air pollution from the 
power plants would have had a serious effect on Zion’s and 
the region’s air quality. The strip mine near Bryce Canyon 
would have imperiled the magnificent panorama from the 
southwestern part of the park. Mining operations would be 
visible from Yovimpa Point and other parts of the park, and 
there would have been disturbing noise from blasting and 
machinery operation heard throughout the park. Moreover, 
the project would cost a lot more than alternatives that were 
also environmentally better and would avoid harm to the 
parks.
Most of the five billion dollars required to build the project 
was to come from California's two largest electric utilities. 
Therefore, before the project could proceed, a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity was required from the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The CPUC 
had for years paid lip service to the notion that cheaper 
energy alternatives such as conservation, cogeneration, 
small-hydro, and geothermal should be the first choice of 
utilities before nuclear and coal plants. The availability and 
cost of these alternatives were, therefore, central issues in 
the proceeding, which lasted over 100 days. The evidence 
(to the surprise of even the CPUC and its staff) was 
overwhelming—a combination of alternative energy 
sources could replace Allen-Warner Valley and would not 
only be cheaper for rate payers, but also would provide 
substantial benefits for the utilities shareholders. The 
utilities, after the close of the hearing, but before the 
CPUC could issue its decision, saw the handwriting on the 
wall and abandoned the project in favor of the alternatives.
This meant, of course, that California could meet its 
energy needs without jeopardizing the important natural 
values Bryce and Zion were established to protect. 
Ironically, President Carter and his Interior Department, 
which had done so much for the national park system by 
adding millions of acres of parkland in Alaska, instead of 
supporting and advocating the alternatives which could
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have avoided harm to Bryce and Zion, embraced Allen- 
Warner Valley and even attempted to undermine the 
California proceeding. Luckily, the attempt was not 
successful.
The administration saw this project as a way to reduce 
dependence on unreliable and expensive foreign oil 
supplies at the time of the Iranian hostage crisis and placed 
it on the "Critical Energy Facilities" list, a fast-track for 
favored projects. They saw Allen-Warner Valley as a 
symbol that the administration (contrary to the opinion 
polls) was not inept, at least in the energy field, and could 
make a big energy project happen. Apparently smaller, 
cheaper, and more environmentally benign alternatives, 
which could also reduce the use of oil, were not as 
symbolic as big coal plants and untested synfuel schemes. 
The well-meaning Park Service, despite its clear legal 
authority to protect the parks and despite the command of 
the National Environmental Policy Act that, where conflicts 
exist in using resources alternatives should be pursued 
vigorously, was caught between its trust responsibilities 
and the illogical, politically motivated, energy policy of the 
President.
The CPUC proceeding had provided a forum to examine 
alternatives to Allen-Warner Valley, and the system worked 
despite the hostility of the Carter Administration. While 
Park Service personnel informally supported the effort to 
develop alternatives which would avoid harm to Bryce and 
Zion, they did not actively develop and promote alter­
natives or participate in the California proceedings. Yet, 
there was strong historical support for this type of 
aggressive and vigorous stewardship.
Protecting Olympic's Sitka Spruce—
A Paradigm of Effective Stewardship
When World War II 
broke out, the frames of 
airplanes, for the most 
part, were made of 
wood. The shortage of 
metals at the start of the 
war made the need for 
timber to construct air- 
framesparticularlyimpor- 
tant. Sitka spruce wood 
was ideal for this 
purpose, and the most 
concentrated and acces­
sible stands of Sitka 
spruce were those of 
Olympic National Park.
Olympic National Park 
is located on a 
peninsula on the 
western edge of Washington State. The Pacific slope of 
the park is a primeval rain forest with magnificent conifer 
stands, which grow up the lower slopes of the glacier- 
carved Olympic Range. These mountains have about sixty 
glaciers and rise to nearly 8,000 feet. Sitka spruce grows 
very well under the ideal conditions found on Olympic's 
western slopes.
The War Production Board—the federal agency
responsible for ensuring adequate war materials—
Northwest timber and commercial interests, and Great 
Britain and France (with an acute need for airframe timber) 
placed substantial pressures on the Park Service to allow 
logging of Sitka spruce in Olympic. Then Park Service
Director Newton Drury, with support of the Secretary of the 
Interior, the tough and resourceful Harold Ickes, began 
actively to pursue the availability of alternatives to Sitka 
spruce to avoid or at least minimize the sacrifice of Olympic. 
Understanding the tension between park preservation and 
the harsh realities of war, Drury confronted the issue 
directly:
...[T]he virgin forests in the national parks should 
not be cut unless the trees are absolutely essential 
to the prosecution of the war, with no alternative, 
and only as a last resort. Critical necessity rather 
than convenience should be the governing 
reason for such sacrifice of an important part of our 
federal estate.
Clearcutting —  Olympic National Forest Photo by D. Huff
The National Park Service sought out alternative 
supplies of Sitka spruce as well as substitute materials for 
constructing airframes. Substantial and accessible stands 
of these trees were found in British Columbia and Alaska. 
Moreover, increased supplies of aluminum became 
available, a material that was found to be better than wood 
for airframes. Thus, there was no need to log in Olympic 
and the War Production Board withdrew its order to the 
Park Service.
The Park Service strategy of aggressively investigating 
and pursuing alternatives to Olympic's Sitka spruce 
worked. Undertaken in the midst of World War II, with all of 
its patriotic fervor, it is a clear example of the kind of 
stewardship needed to protect the national parks now, as 
external threats loom larger and larger. However, despite 
having clear authority and responsibility actively to seek out 
alternatives when parks are threatened, without a specific 
and unambiguous legislative command, as the Allen- 
Warner Valley case illustrates, the Park Service may not be 
as bold as it was under the leadership of Drury and Ickes 
during World Warll.
Some Final Thoughts
In a report entitled State of the Parks— 1980, initiated by 
Congress and prepared by the Park Service, the magni­
tude of the external threats issue becomes too apparent. 
While the report is not perfect (its underlying data are 
certainly difficult to decipher), its central conclusion is 
beyond dispute—the parks are in trouble from in­
compatible development on adjacent land. The Park 
Service, in this report, specifically recognizes the impor­
tance of a park protection strategy based on developing 
alternatives to park-threatening activities:
Sitka Spruce —  Olympic National Park. 
Photo by D. Huff
The National Park Service cannot remain on 
the sidelines and expect to reject a proposed 
project merely because it poses a potential threat 
to park resources or park values. As Federal Land 
Managers, we must be prepared to identify viable 
alternatives in those situations where proposed 
development activity would damage the parks.
Yet, nearly six years have passed since State of the 
Parks was released and the Park Service has been unable 
to implement a formal program to ensure that alternatives 
are vigorously pursued and considered when a park is 
threatened by external development. While Congress has 
considered some legislation to protect the parks from 
external threats, these legislative proposals, for the most 
part, just restate the problem rather than provide needed 
additional clout for the Park Service, and they have gone 
nowhere. It is true that the Park Service has ample legal 
authority and, in fact, the legal responsibility to establish 
the procedures that would ensure the kind of alternatives 
review suggested above. Yet the political reality is that 
resource development, these days, is seen by too many 
politicians as more important than protecting the natural 
and cultural values of the national parks. However, 
because so many millions of people from all walks of life 
have found this great and unique American institution to 
be so important a sanctuary, the choices we make today 
about protecting the parks will be a good measure of the 
quality of our society.
* * * * * * * *
At the height of World War II, a former park ranger then in 
military service wrote to Park Service Director Drury, urging 
that the parks remain open for the duration of the war. It 
was important, this soldier concluded, especially during 
the terrible crisis at hand to have:
...recreation areas where inspiration combines 
with relaxation to give a new lease on life and hope 
forthe future.
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1. Sitka Spruce Problem.
Sitka spruce, which grows in Washington and Oregon, British 
Columbia, and Alaska, is the most desirable sourct of lumber for 
use in the manufacture, of airplanes. Since the First World War, 
much of the most accessible supply of Sitka spruce had been cut and 
used for other purposes than airplane manufacture, largely because 
of the change from wood to aluminum in airplane construction. With 
the advent of the new war in Europe, the supply of metal became in­
adequate and suitable woods, particularly Sitka spruce, were in 
urgent demand for airplane manufacture by the United Kingdom and 
France.̂ )
On May 6, 1939, Secretary Ickes, as Administrator of Public 
'Works, had allotted #1,750,000 of Public Works funds to the Na­
tional Park Service for the acquisition in the 6tate of Washington 
of a corridor along the Queets Fiver between Olympic National Park 
and the Pacific Coast, and its extension northward along the cost 
to Ozette Lake, for parkway purposes. The lands contemplated for 
purchase within the Queets Corridor amounted to 13,353 acres and 
•were estimated to contain 51,616,000 ft. B. M. of Sitka spruce in 
mixture with other species. In the Ocean strip the contemplated 
acreage was 37,00? acres and the estimated stand of Sitka spruce 
was 75,103,000 ft. B. M., but for the most part inaccessible and 
not of a quality suitable for airplane stock. Later, due to a 
shortage of funds to purchase.all of the area originally contemplated, 
these acreages and estimates were reduced to 11,731 acres for the 
Queets Corridor, with an estimated stand of 39,763,000 ft. B. M. of 
Sitka spruce of which 6,017,000 ft. B. M. were rated as first class: 
and 33,071 acres for the Ocean Strip, with an estimated 57,660,000 
ft, B, f-1. of Sitka spruce, 12,319,000 ft. B. M. of which were rated 
first class.
/^After the entry of C-reat Britain and France into the war in 
September 1939, the demand for Sitka spruce airplane lumber from 
the Pacific Northwest to help meet the needs of those countries 
became quite acute/) The Queets Corridor contained some of the 
best and most accessible of the remaining Sitka spruce most suitable 
for airplane lumber, and therefore became the objective of searchers 
for spruce to meet these war requirements. The Poison Logging Com- 
pany, owners of some of the land and timber proposed for condemnation 
in the Queets Corridor, were logging spruce in that area, part of 
which was destined for Great Britain and France. This coiwiany ivrote 
to the Secretary under date of May 3, I9I1O, requesting authority to 
continue the logging of spruce on its lands -within the corridor and 
on other lands within the corridor in which it held an interest.
The question as to the acuteness of the spruce airplane lumber 
situation was referred by th<- Secretary's office to Mr. Lee Muck, 
at that time [Jir. ctor of For-st;. in the Department. A memorandum
tlat'.d May 17, 19b 0, i’or Mr. bur Lew i.n this regard was prepared 
.jointly by Chief Forester John D . C off nan of t.he National Park 
Service and Mr. Lee Muck. As a result of the study of this situa­
tion, some of the spruce lands contemplated for condemnation we re 
excluded from the acquisition propram, and on some of the other 
lands retained in the propram the owners were permitted, through 
stipulations entered in the condemnation proceedings, to log 
spruce and Douglas-fir on their lands, thus averting interference 
with the v/ar needs of the United Kingdom and France. This re­
leased a large part of the airplane spruce in the Queets Corridor.
The passage of Lend-Lease legislation, which was approved 
March 11, 19b1, and the increasing tempo of defense preparations 
by the United States, created a greater demand for airplane spruce 
lumber, accompanied by numerous requests that the Queets Corridor 
and Olympic National Park be opened to the logging of Sitka spruce. 
Continuing studies were made in the field and in 'Washington as to 
the spruce airplane lumber requirements for the United States and 
our allies, and as to the possibility of supplying an increasing 
proportion of the needs for the United Kingdom by increased produc­
tion in British Columbia and the initiation of spruce production 
from the national forest in southeast Alaska. The question of 
substitute species was also given attention-.
Close touch was maintained in Washington, D. C. with the 
Lumber and Lumber Products Division of the Vfer Production Board, 
-with members of Congress from the State of Washington, and with 
other sources of information relating to the Sitka spruce situa­
tion.
The National Park Service viewpoint was expressed in Director 
Norton B, Drury’s memoranda of November 18, 19b 1, to the First 
assistant Secretary and is summarized in the following quotation:
(1) "Selective cutting" in portions of the-Queets 
Corridor and Coastal Strip might be authorized as a last 
resort if immediate public necessity in the emergency as 
distinguished from the convenience of specific operators, 
can be shown.
(2) This will be a distinct sacrifice of park values 
in the interest of national defense. Selective cutting, 
together with the activities incident thereto, will largely 
destroy the qualities for which these lands are being ac­
quired .
(3) Legislation to permit logging in Olympic National 
Park should be resisted.
(b) In order to insure an adequate supply of airplane 
spruce, and at the same time to relieve the pressure on the
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Olympic National Park, the possibility of utilizing the 
largo spruce resources in Alaska should be investigated 
at once, with a view to making this large body of sprue*1 
available for purposes of national defense.
The lands in the Queets Corridor- purchased by the Federal Gov­
ernment from Public Works funds for partway purposes are not a part 
of Olympic National Park and arc; therefore not subject to the pro­
visions of law precluding commercial sales of timbe>r from national 
park lands. As the pressure for Sitka spruce airplane stock be­
came more intensive, the representatives of the War Production 
Board suggested the release of government owned Sitka spruce in 
the Queets Corridor as a contribution to the war program. This 
meant a distinct sacrifice of parkway features, but in order to 
assist the war program and at the same time hoping to lighten the 
pressure for Sitka spruce from national park lands, the Service 
recommended to the Secretary the approval of a sale of spruce and 
Douglas-fir on government ovmed lands within the Queets Corridor, 
to be marked on a careful selective basis, and with provision for 
retention of a forest screen along the road. The Secretary ap­
proved and, after advertising, a sale of 3,000,000 board feet of 
Sitka spruce and 800,000 board feet of Douglas-fir was made to 
L. J- Esses, of Montesano, Washington, the only bidder, on Feb­
ruary 6, 19^3 - Delays in cutting operations by the purchaser and 
modifications in the cutting area later reduced this sale by ap­
proximately a million board feet.
On January 20, iylj3, F. K. Brundage, Western Log and Lumber 
Administrator for the War Production Board wrote the Department 
pf the Interior setting forth the critical need for Sitka spruce 
/and requesting that the Hoh River and 3ogachiel River areas within 
'Olympic National Park be opened at an early date for the cutting 
of high quality spruce and Douglas-fir.
j
Beginning in I9I4O close touch was maintained with Colonel 
Wm. B. Greeley, Secretary-Manager of the West Coast Lumbermen's 
Association, Seattle, Washington, who is one of the best informed 
men on the timber and lumber situation in the Northwest. Oppor­
tunities for conference with Colonel Greeley occurred during his 
trips to Washington, D. C., and during the visits of Service of­
ficials to Seattle, Washington. The monthly reviews of the lumber 
situation issued by the Yfest Coast Lumbermen's Association were 
obtained and read with care. Similar contact -was also maintained 
with Mr. Brundage after his appointment to the post of Western 
Log and Lumber Administrator for the War Production Board. Both 
of these authorities on the spruce situation counseled that the 
National Park Service should hold itself in readiness to make 
spruce available from Olympic National Park if and when that be­
came essential for the prosecution of the war program, and should 
m  the meantime develop a definite plan as to the manner in which
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such action could be initiated without delay v.'h- n the need arrived. 
Both declared the absence of logginr within the national park had 
not up to that time delayed tin war program, but they believed that 
home of file park spruce would be needed and that the National Park 
fervio should be ready and willing to make the sacrifice.
As the pressure for spruce from Olympic Nntional’Park grew iy in­
tensity', National Park Service efforts grew apace to obtain accurate 
statistics of the supply of spruce timber,'both in this country and in 
British Columbia, and the production from each of these sources; 
the amounts required by the United States as compared with the 
amounts required by the United Kingdom; the proportion of the 
United Kingdom spruce requirements furnished by the United States 
as compared with the amount furnished from British Columbia; what 
species furnished satisfactory substitutes for spruce airplane 
stock, and the abundance and accessibility of the timber stands 
of such substitute species.
These studies required a large amount of investigation in the 
Northwest by National Park Service officers; the obtaining of the 
best available statistics of the spruce resources of British 
Columbia; a visit to the Forest Products Laboratory at Madison,' 
Wisconsin, to ascertain the facts regarding the qualities of 
spruce and spruce substitutes for aircraft manufacture; visits to 
airplane factories in the vicinity of Chicago manufacturing train­
ing planes for the Army and Navy; obtaining of information from 
the Forest Service, from the Department of Commerce and from Army 
representatives; and conferences with members of the Lumber and 
Lumber Products Division of the War Production Board.
The officials of the Lumber and Lumber Products Division were 
quite cooperative in making available the confidential figures as 
to United States Army and Navy estimates of requirements, which 
varied greatly from time to time, and also the figures relating 
to production in this country of spruce, noble, fir, western hem­
lock, and Douglas-fir aircraft lumber and the amounts of each sup­
plied to the United Kingdom and to the United States.JThese 
statistics indicated that the supply of Sitka spruce aircraft 
lumber produced in the United States was very carefully divided 
between the United States and the United Kingdom. It was, however, 
impossible to ascertain the amount of Sitka spruce that was fur­
nished to the United Kingdom from British Columbia. These sta­
tistics were held by the Canadian government as confidential war 
information. Without that information it was impossible to de­
termine whether Canada was exerting herself to supply all possible 
aircraft spruce to meet the requirements of the United Kingdom or 
whether the United States was being forced to shoulder the larger 
share of the burden while the spruce forests of British Columbia 
were being conserved as compared with the Sitka spruce resources 
of .ashinrton and Oregon. \ It appeared as if all efforts to solve
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;,his question were being shunted aside when they reached the L- nd- 
Loase authorities who were responsible for the aircraft lumber ship­
ments to the. United Kingdom. However, in August 19h3, there finally 
appeared publicity on spruce production in British Columbia, pub­
lished in the Pacific Coast lumber .iournals, which indicated that 
much greater activity had oecn injected into spruce production by 
government controlled Aero Timber Products, Ltd. of Canada with 
greatly increased supplies of aircraft lumber from British Columbia.
T'ne sale made in the Queets Corridor failed to halt the demand 
for the release of ..spruce from within the Olympic National Park.
The Chamber of Commerce in Port Angeles, Washington, the Grays Har­
bor War production Council and the Washington State Planning Coun­
cil were all pressing for the release of timber from Olympic Na­
tional Park. On May 6, 19li3, Director Drury, Regional Director 
Tomlinson, Superintendent 'Macy, and members of his staff, and 
Chief Forester Coffman met in Port Angeles with a small group rep- 
presenting business interests and the Chamber of Commerce of that 
town to exchange ideas on this subject. The Chamber of Commerce 
had adopted a resolution recommending the elimination from the na­
tional park and the transfer to the Olympic National Forest of 
that portion of the Calawah River and Pogachiel River drainages 
west of the township line bet ween Ranges 9 and 10 ’/Test, Willamette 
Meridian, and north of the township line between Townships 26 and 
2? North. The intent of this resolution was clearly to make a 
part of the park timber available for normal postwar needs as well 
as to furnish materials needed in the war program. Mr. Drury 
indicated that he was there to discuss only the question of war 
needs. J
In response to an urgent invitation to meet with the repre­
sentatives of the lumber and war industries of Grays Harbor, Di­
rector Drury, Regional Director Tomlinson, Superintendent Macy, 
and Chief Forester Coffman met with a group of lij at a luncheon 
at Aberdeen, Washington, on May 8, 191/3, arranged by C. A. Pitch-' 
ford, Chairman of the Grays Harbor War Production Council. Mr.
Drury explained that the cutting of any of the live forests within 
the national parks under any system of logging, however selective 
and restrictive, is contrary to the principles upon which the na­
tional parks were established; that once the logging of timber is 
introduced, the area no longer exists as a superlative virgin 
forest. Mr. Drury also explained that before consideration could 
be given to logging within the national park all other available 
sources of supply should be investigated and developed and there 
would have to be a definite showing that the war requirements 
could not be met from these other sources.
I Letters presented to Mr. Drury at this luncheon showed def­
initely that the Grays Harbor interests were attempting to open 
up the entire Olympic National Park to logging, with the exception
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of tin- f Mrnvr small Olympic National Monument area which occupies 
the highest portion of the park and contains little forest that could 
be considered ol commercial character. Their demands were not re­
stricted to Sitka spruce to meet the war requirements for airplane 
materials, but included all species of timber needed on a permanent 
basis to maintain the Grays Harbor industries after the war as well 
as during the war. As at port nngeles, Mr. Drury indicated that he 
•was there to discuss only the question of -war needs. Quite- a number 
of the business men, and one labor representative, in attendance at 
the luncheon were emphatic in their criticism of the stand taken by 
the National park Service./
Under date of May 12, 19li3, P. H. Brundage, Western Log and 
Lumber Administrator for the War Production Board, wrote the Aber­
deen Chamber of Commerce advising them that he had in December 19lj2r 
strongly urged the Lumber & Lumber Froducts Division of the War 
Production Board in Washington, D. C. to take action which would 
make spruce and Douglas-fir within Olympic National Park available 
to the lumber industry, This was welcome incentive to the lumber 
interests for the organization of a concerted movement to force 
the opening of the park to logging. A resolution recommending re­
duction in the area of Olympic National Park was adopted by the 
Seattle Chamber of Conmerce on June 1, 19li3, and numerous editor­
ials supporting this idea appeared in Seattle newspapers and in 
papers published in Olympia and. in the- Olympic peninsula. The 
park, however, was not devoid of friends and defenders.
This effort to open Olympic National Park to logging reached 
its climax during the hearings of the House Subcommittee on Lumber 
Matters in Seattle, Washington, July 12 to lli, 19ii3j when the 
proponents of the scheme endeavored to obtain consideration for 
logging within Olympic National Park, not only to meet war needs, 
but more especially to maintain their operations in the postwar 
period. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, Representative Henry M. 
Jackson of Washington, informed the witnesses that the Secretary 
of the Interior was prepared to release from the park whatever 
timber was needed in the prosecution of the war and was not avail­
able from any other source; that the Subcommittee was not author­
ized to go into the matter of postwar needs; and that Congress had 
settled the question of park boundaries when it enacted legislation 
in 1938 establishing Olympic National Park.
In order to be prepared for prompt action if it should finally 
be shown that the logging of spruce in Olympic National Park was 
imperative for the prosection of the war, careful consideration was 
given by the National Park Service, the Office of the Solicitor and 
the Office of the Secretary to the question of the method by which 
this action legally could be authorized. A careful study was like­
wise made by members of the park and regional office personnel to 
d> tt-rmino the- boundaries of the several spruce areas within the
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;/cstern portion of Mu. park and th*. sequence in which they should . 
sacrificed to moot war n<-<..d.«; if th-.t became necessary.
Tlac exchange oi corrosion bot.veen thw Secretary and pv,
nan Donald M. Nelson of the war Production Board as the r-'vilt ' ^ '
Mr. Brundage *s letter of January 20, 19ii3, f ina J ly culminated \v * 
Secretary Ickes* lengthy letter of September l2j, 1 9/4 3, listing e- 
measures which night help to relieve the critical Sitka spruce V*- '
ation without inroads upon Olympic National Park, and Mr. Nelson u " '  
reply of Sep (. ember 23, 19li3> withdrawing the request of the War 
Production Board for spruce from Olympic National Park unless fu- '' ' 
ture unforeseen conditions should arise making a renewal of Miat V A  
reauest necessary. v-y.% \ c
At the hearings held in Washington, D. C., on October ll^n^ , - 
12, before the House Subcommittee on Lumber Matters, J. Philipp 
Boyd, Director of the Lumber and Lumber Products Division of th&c * ^
War production Board, testified that the logging of Sitka spruced l o 
from the Olympic Motional Park is not at this time necessary to * \ 
meet war aircraft needs, and that the Department of the Interior A  
had been so notified. | Mr. Boyd stated that a change in aircraft 
lumber requirements had occurred while discussions were in progress 
between the War Production Board and the Department of the Interior; 
that the decision not to construct C-?6 cargo planes of wood,changes 
in other types of planes, and the increase in the supply of aluminum 
available for aircraft production had helped the situation.
With increased spruce aircraft lumber production in British 
Columbia, increased production from the Alaska Spruce Log Program, 
and greater availability of aluminum for aircraft manufacture, tin 
situation had eased very materially by October 19143"•
In the June I9I4I4 issue of The Timberman Mr. Brundage is quoted 
as stating that after September or at the latest October, and per­
haps earlier, Treasury Procurement through Lend-Lease will take no 
more spruce aircraft lumber for delivery to the United Kingdom.
Thus the threat of invasion of Olympic National pork by logging 
appears to have been safely outridden.
The following conversation between Colonel ’ft:.'.lism B. Greeley, 
Secretary-Manager of the West Coast Lumbermen•s Association, Seattle 
Washington, and Director Newton B. Drury at th-. Cosmos Club, Wash­
ington, D. C., on Hay 26, 19lib, epitomizes National Park Service 
policy in this crisis and illustrates the spirit in which negotia­
tions were conducted:
W.B.G. Good day, sir.
N.B.D. Good day, Colonel Greeley. Did the spruce 
situation come out to your satisfaction?
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W.B.G. As a practical matter, y<.s.
N.B.D. v7e did what you asked of us— put ourselves in 
a position where we could move- quickly if war 
need were shown.
W . B .0 . Of course I don't like the idea that when our 
boys are being drafted etc., etc., it is 
necessary to hold park timber to the last and 
compel a showing that it is absolutely needed. 
I don't think it should be sacrosanct.
N.B.D. That's just what I do think. If it isn't 
sacrosanct, it shouldn't be in a national 
park.
W.B.G. Well, I have always thought that Olympic Na­
tional Park was too large.
N.B.D. That is of course debatable. It is a separate 
issue that can better be studied in calmer 
times. At both meetings I attended on the 
Olympic Peninsula to consider war needs, the 
discussion quickly veered to the question of 
using park timber to sustain local industries. 
’We were not there to discuss that. I hope to 
see you in the Northwest,
W.B.G. I hope so, too. Good day, sir.
We might add that the final outcome of the spruce situation was 
also to the satisfaction of the National Park Service.
2. Contributions to the National Lumber Supply.
While the Sitka spruce negotiations v-/ere progressing, the Service 
gave evidence of its willingness to cooperate l o y a l l y  in the war pro­
gram by making available needed timbers from various sources not en­
tailing the mutilation of the parks. Such evidences of loyalty and 
good '/fill helped the Service to withstand direct attacks on park 
resources.
For instance, an unexpected source of f'ood airplane timber was 
provided by the blowing down of Douglas-^ fir trees on Finley Creek, 
in the Quinault River drainage within Olympic National Park, creat­
ing a high fire hazard. This area adjoined privately-owned cutover 
lands on which there was a considerable amount of unburned slash, 
which exposed the windthrown and standing timber on national park 
lands to greater danger. As a fire hazard reduction measure, a 
sale of the fallen and badly leaning trees was made on July 10,19ii3,
12
to the H. end D. Timber Conpany of Aberdeen, u--shingtor., \ch has
-suited in the renova1 of approximately 2,000,000 board feet of 
timber, predominantly Douglas-fir, which was utilized in connection 
with the war program.
jJ-ther ways in which the Service was able to make timber re­
sources available and other minor threats to Service forested areas 
-re discussed below:
Dead Chestnut for Extract YTood. Shenandoah National Park, Blue 
Hid go parkway and Great Smoky Mountains National Park lie within the 
natural range of the chestnut (Castanea dentnta), and include some 
heavy stands of this species. The chestnut, was one of the most 
valuable commercial species in eastern United States until the chest 
nut blight (Endothia parasitica), an exotic fungous disease, first 
observed in this country in Nov/ York City in 190h, spread through 
the; eastern forests, resulting in the death of the chestnut. Chest­
nut wood contains a high percentage of tannin and the standing dead 
trees retain commercial value for a long period of years for certain 
types of lumber, for veneer core stock in the manufacture of plywood 
a.nd for tannin extract wood.
A considerable quantity of dead chestnut was cut along the 
skyline drive in Shenandoah National Park by the Civilian Conserva­
tion Corps some years back as a fire hazard reduction project and 
public safety measure, and for improvement of the scenic and 
aesthetic features. At that time an attempt was made to interest 
a tannin extract plant in Luray, Virginia, in this material, but 
the financial condition of the company was such that it w s  not 
prepared to haul and utilise the mv tarial oven with no charge for 
it. The wood was accordingly used so far as possible for lumber 
v.'Lthin the nark and for firewood in the CCC cams, and was also 
nado available to the local residents who were willing to haul it 
y •
Some inquiries wore node before the war by manufacturers of 
casket wood and tannin extract as to the availability of dead 
civ stnut within Great Smoky Mountains National park. Examination 
by pur it officials showed that logging operations within that park 
'■'or. Id result in severe erosion and injury to p; rk vulvas.
During the war, especially during that period when enemy sub- 
,n trines were operating actively in the Caribbean wators, causing a 
shortage m  the importation of tannin extract wood, the demand for 
<-no stnut in order to meet war rccuirem nts for tannin became very 
-•cute. Request was made by tannin extract manufacturer: and a" 
yy representatives of the Vfcr Deiaarti?it end tie 
dn-ard that consideration be giv. u by the W.'tiervl i 
j'1’-' rt-lease of some of t.ho dead ch stnut which r 
■~or-Z the Jliv Mi' g,, parkway, A study was m-d..
-■mule cead chestnut stands and H  was found that
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Executive Summary
California's two largest utilities are planning 
to build a series of new coal plants, beginning with 
the 2500 MW Allen-Wamer Valley energy system in Utah 
and Nevada. This analysis looks at an alternative: 
getting the same amount of new energy from conserva­
tion and various alternative energy sources. It 
finds that such an alternative is fully feasible, 
and that if the utilities pursued it instead of 
Allen-Wamer Valley and other planned development, 
they would save approximately $500 million (in present 
value) for their ratepayers between now and 1992.
Because the full energy yield of the planned 
coal plants can be obtained through utility development 
of conservation and alternative sources instead, 
providing the same energy in the same time frame with 
the same reliability, and because to do so is more 
financially advantageous than building the coal 
plants, this analysis concludes that the Allen-Wamer 
Valley system is unnecessary.
The results of the computer-based financial 
analysis show that there is a clear choice for the 
utilities (and their regulators), between building 
Allen-Wamer Valley and other planned coal plants on 
the one hand, and developing energy alternatives 
and conservation on the other. And the choice is 
inescapable. The analysis shows that developing 
some of both, an option often proposed as a compro­
mise, is financially a worst choice for ratepayers, 
resulting in the highest bills of any of the scenarios 
analzyed. This is so, even accounting for the 
benefits of very high reductions in oil and gas use.
(As analyzed, the development of alternatives and 
conservation by themselves would reduce oil and 
gas consumption in power plants by approximately 737„ 
and 867o respectively for the two utilities, between 
now and 1992, or 59% and 627o counting cogeneration.)
The alternatives analyzed are all preferred under 
California energy policy. They include: increased
end-use efficiency in residential, commercial and 
industrial sectors; increased distribution efficiency; 
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In the next decade, California's two largest utilities 
are planning a major shift to coal as a source of electric 
power. The first of several new large coal projects in 
which they intend to participate is the Allen-Wamer Valley 
Energy System (AWV Energy System), a 2500 MW complex which 
includes two generating sites, a water project, a coal 
mine, and a coal slurry transportation system in south­
western Utah and southern Nevada, near Bryce Canyon and 
Zion National Parks. At the same time, the utilities plan 
not to proceed with full scale development of alternative 
energy sources, including conservation.
This report looks at what would happen if the two 
utilities did develop alternative energy sources in 
California, in reasonable and feasible amounts. It shows 
that the alternatives, which are preferred under California 
energy policy, are available to the utilities in large 
enough amounts that they can fully match the AWV Energy 
System and other projected power plants, in terms of energy, 
capacity, reliability, and timeliness, for all purposes in­
cluding reduction of oil and gas use. Significantly for 
the ratepayers who must foot the bill, developing the alter­
natives is also a cheaper way to meet the same energy needs. 
In other words, the AWV Energy System and the other con­
ventional power plants on the drawing board are unnecessary.
Whether the AWV Energy System is needed or not is a 
question now pending before the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC), since the two utilities, Southern 
California Edison Co. (SCE) and Pacific Gas and Electric 
Co. (PG&E) have applied for a certificate of public conve­
nience and necessity for that specific project. The
-1-
decision is particularly important, because the data 
strongly suggest that participation by SCE and PG&E in 
the AWV Energy System would seriously impede utility 
efforts to increase energy efficiency and develop alter­
native generating resources, which the CPUC five years 
ago called "the most important task facing utilities," 
and which it then stated would be "a key question in 
future rate proceedings and decisions on supply authori­
zation."—  ̂ The California Energy Commission also has 
made the point:
The next 12 to 18 months can make a critical 
difference in California's energy future.
Energy Commission studies of alternative 
energy futures for California indicate 
that, without new initiatives, we may miss 
major opportunities to obtain the benefits 
of a transition to conservation, renewable 
energy sources and other preferred techno­
logies . Our studies suggest that California 
is already committed to a largely conven­
tional energy future through the 1980s, and 
will increasingly depend on this future 
unless dramatic steps are taken to include 
conservation and alternatives in energy 
planning.
California Energy Commission,
1979 Biennial Report at 55.
Simply stated, the AWV proposal puts California at an 
energy crossroads, where a decision must be made between 
competing methods of energy growth.
This report, which finds one choice clearly preferable 
to the other in terms of financial impact, risk, and state 
policy, relies on a computer-based analysis of the finan­
cial consequences of SCE's and PG&E's announced supply 
plans (the utilities' scenario), compared side by side 
with the financial consequences of a plan made up of 
reasonable energy alternatives in feasible amounts (the 
EDF scenario). An earlier version of the analysis was
-2-
applied by the Environmental Defense Fund to PG&E's 
supply plan in 1978, caused the CPUC to begin its own 
investigation into the extent to which energy alternatives 
could replace large new central station plants for PG&E, 
and led to the conclusion last year that PG&E could be
2 /making much greater use of the cogeneration alternative.— 
The measures in the EDF scenario are already known 
to the utilities, and all of them are already relied on 
to some degree in the utilities' supply plans. The utili­
ties' scenario simply puts less emphasis on them than does 
EDF's scenario. These measures include increased efficiency 
in residential, commercial, and agricultural end-uses 
of electricity, and increased development of geothermal, 
cogeneration, wind, and biomass.
Footnotes
1/ CPUC Decision 84902 (1975). 
2/ CPUC Decision 91109 (1979).
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II. PURPOSE OF REPORT
The purpose of this report is to evaluate the economic 
consequences for California if the AWV Energy System is 
developed, and to compare these systematically to the 
economic consequences of developing a set of reasonable 
alternatives that would yield the same results. The eco­
nomics are vital because California ratepayers and utilities 
would have to pay for a large part of the AWV Energy System 
as proposed; if there are reasonable alternatives that are 
financially more attractive in comparison, then both state 
policy and common sense dictate that these alternatives 
should be developed instead.
Thus, the economic analysis performed for this report 
goes directly to the question of need for the AWV Energy 
System. If there is an economically preferable alternative, 
which is feasible and reasonable, then the AWV Energy System 
is not needed. SCE and PG&E have asserted the need for AWV 
to the CPUC, and have put need in issue by applying for a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for the 
project.—  ̂ The CPUC has explicitly recognized that "a 
thorough evaluation of the economic effects of the [AWV] 
project compared to other alternatives" must be performed 
as part of its consideration of need for the project.—^
The focus of this report is precisely that kind of compre­
hensive financial comparison using computer simulation.
The U.S. Department of the Interior recently concluded 
that energy alternatives are a complete and feasible substi­
tute for the AWV Energy System.—  ̂ The Department's Draft 
EIS evaluates "energy conservation and the development of 
alternative energy sources" as an alternative to the AWV 
Energy System, and finds that alternative to be reasonable,
-4-
technically feasible, and capable of supplying not only all 
capacity represented by the proposed 2500 MW project, but 
also a surplus of more than 4000 additional MW over the 
needs of SCE and PG&E.—  ̂ The specific measures considered 
are very similar to those in the EDF scenario. They include 
conservation and load management, cogeneration, geothermal, 
wind, and biomass.—  ̂ The Draft EIS considers only those al­
ternatives that could be installed by 1991, based on tech­
nical, economic and other feasibility criteria, and which 
are not already in the SCE and PG&E resource plans available 
to the Draft EIS a u t h o r s . T h u s ,  at the Draft EIS stage, 
federal analysts confirm that energy alternatives, developed 
in reasonable and feasible amounts, could fully replace 
the AWV Energy System.
The Draft EIS does not, however, purport to make any 
evaluations of comparative cost. The analysis reported 
here provides that missing link, by evaluating the costs 
of the AWV Energy System and a program of alternatives in 
exhaustive detail, and comparing them side by side.
Analysis of alternatives is also particularly appro­
priate in this case, because the proposed AWV project, 
due to its location and characteristics, would have an un­
usually severe impact on majestic national trust lands and 
on vital indigenous water resources. The AWV Energy System 
is thus likely to face considerable difficulties in obtaining 
necessary permits and approvals, and thus its reliability 
as a source of electricity in the projected time frame is 
uncertain. If there is an alternative which avoids these 
impacts and risks, at no higher cost, the CPUC should be 




1/ CPUC Appl. 59308. The Application was accepted for 
filing on January 9, 1980.
2/ CPUC Appl. 59308, Decision 91968, p. 4 (1980).
3/ U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage­
ment, Allen-Warner Valley Energy System Draft Environ­
mental Impact Statement pp. S-15 through S-16, 2-40 




6/ Ibid., p. 2-46.
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III. DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS
A. METHOD
The analysis reported here makes an economic compari­
son of two resource plans, or scenarios. The first scenario 
is what is set forth in the officially reported resource 
plans of SCE and PG&E, which include development of the AWV 
Energy System. The second scenario, or resource plan, 
consists of the development of preferred alternative re­
sources, and does not include the AWV Energy System. Both 
scenarios meet the same energy needs for SCE and PG&E, in 
the same time frame.
The basic thrust of the analysis is comparative. It 
provides information to answer the question: all other
things being equal, what financial difference would it make 
to follow one scenario or the other. To make a fair com­
parison, the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario are 
assembled and analyzed using a common set of economic 
assumptions in both cases. (With a few exceptions, these 
are the same assumptions used by the utilities themselves 
in planning.) Thus, when financial results are calculated 
and compared, the differences are the differences caused 
by the use of different energy resources, and not differences 
caused by the use of varying economic assumptions (e .g ., 
different results caused by assuming different future in­
flation rates) .
Each scenario is constructed with a large body of data 
sufficient to capture the relevant financial effects at 
approximately the same level of accuracy as that achieved 
by utilities themselves in supply planning.—  ̂ The financial 
consequences of each scenario are derived by computer
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simulation using the same calculating methods in both cases. 
These methods, contained in a financial model designed for 
computer use, are closely patterned after the financial 
models used by utilities themselves in calculating the 
financial consequences of their own resource plans for in­
ternal planning purposes.
The model used is the ELFIN computer model, designed 
and owned by the Environmental Defense Fund. ELFIN simu­
lates the financial and generation system operations of
a utility given the utility's construction plans, generating
2 /resources, fuel costs, etc.— The result is a comprehensive 
and systematic financial simulation for the utilities' 
scenario on the one hand, and the EDF scenario on the other, 
throughout the 1980-1992 planning period, which can then 
be compared.
A full comparison is complicated by effects that may 
occur beyond the 1980-1992 planning period. These effects 
are highly uncertain due to the nature of any economic 
assumptions for the post-1992 (and, indeed, post-2000) 
period. Nevertheless, for purposes of completeness, they 
have been explored in this analysis by calculating life- 
cycle costs of the proposed projects and their alternatives. 
Details are given in the Technical Appendix.
Footnotes
1/ The data are the utilities' own, with a few exceptions. 
See the Technical Appendix.
2/ EDF's ELFIN model was the subject of a special hearing 
before the CPUC. Order Instituting Investigation 
(Oil) No. 26. The updated version of the ELFIN model, 
used in this analysis, differs in some respects from 
the version that was reviewed in the Oil 26 hearing.
See the Technical Appendix.
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B • DESCRIPTION OF UTILITY AND EPF SCENARIOS
Table 1 displays the resource additions planned in 
the utilities' scenario and the alternative resource 
additions in EDF's scenario in the 1980-1992 period.
These are shown in terms of installed capacity.
The utilities' scenario includes development of two 
major coal projects besides the AWV Energy System: SCE's
California Coal project (620 MW for SCE's planning area in 
the 1991-1992 period) and PG&E's Montezuma facility (1600 MW 
in 1989-1990).
EDF's scenario substitutes additional end-use 
efficiency improvements, geothermal, cogeneration, wind, 
and biomass for the utilities' planned coal development. 
Year-by-year details of the resource additions in EDF's 
scenario are described in Section VI, below. Figure 1 
illustrates the sources of energy production in the 
utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario in 1992.
Figure 2 illustrates the reserve margins in 1992 
for the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario. Both 
the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario provide 
reserve margins that are more than adequate. In fact,
1992 reserve margins are 42%, for SCE and 29% for PG&E 
under the EDF scenario, and 357, and 34% under the utilities' 
scenario, not counting wind generating capacity.-/
These reserve margins need not be considered excessive. 
They are simply the result of shifting oil- and gas-fired 
generating facilities from active use to reserve status. 
Since adequate reserves will be available, the need for 
new facilities to meet peak loads is not an important con­
sideration for SCE and PG&E beyond the very-near term.-/
For the same reason, load-leveling measures such as load
-9-
TABLE 1
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management are not as attractive for SCE and PG&E as they 
may be in other cases, and are, therefore, not considered 
in this report.
Figure 3 illustrates the level of oil and gas use in 
the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario in 1980 and 
1992.
Footnotes
1/ In fact, some portion of wind generating capacity can 
be reliably counted for purposes of meeting peak load. 
Reserve margins are more than adequate, however, even 
if no firm wind capacity is included.
2/ In the 1980-1982 period reserve margins are narrow.
The EDF scenario is more reliable than the utilities' 
scenario in the near-term because end-use efficiency 




Using computer simulation, detailed financial results 
for the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario are pro­
duced. When those results are compared, three principal 
findings are apparent:
1. There are economic benefits for SCE's and PG&E's 
ratepayers if the EDF scenario is developed 
instead of the utilities' scenario. Benefits 
over the 1980-1992 planning period are approxi­
mately $500 million in present value terms,
measured in today's dollars.
2. There are financial benefits for SCE's and PGocE's 
shareholders if the EDF scenario is developed 
instead of the utilities' scenario, in terms of 
quality of earnings and reduced risk to utility 
shareholders, which suggest that, in monetary 
terms, shareholders, at the very least, are 
equally well off, and may be better off, under 
the EDF scenario.
3. The EDF scenario is of equal or greater financial 
feasibility than the utilities' scenario.
Detailed financial results of the computer simulation are 
presented in table form in Appendix II.
A. RATEPAYER EFFECTS
For ratepayers, the financial effect of a given 
scenario of energy development by their utility is the 
amount of money that will be collected from them to pay
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for it; in other words, the revenues that the utility 
must collect to support that development. The value of 
those revenues is measured here in present-value 1980 
dollars.—^
The EDF scenario, if developed instead of SCE's and
PGSeE's current resource plans, would result in a present-
value savings of $500 million ($200 million to SCE's
customers and $300 million to PG&E's) over the 1980-1992
period. See Appendix II, Tables 1 and 2. Life-cycle
analysis also suggests that there would be a net benefit
for ratepayers under the EDF scenario.- The $500 million
saving represents approximately 57„ of the present value of
the revenues required to support the utilities planned 
3/coal projects.— Simply stated, the AWV Energy System 
and other coal projects planned by SCE and PG&E will cost 
their ratepayers $500 million more between now and 1992, 
than the energy alternatives set out in the EDF scenario, 
measured in today's dollars.
B . SHAREHOLDER EFFECTS
The computer simulation uses the assumption that, in 
each scenario, the utilities' shareholders will receive 
the same rate of return on equity. (The purpose of this 
assumption is to permit a fair comparison of the effect on 
ratepayers, undistorted by rate of return differentials.)
Thus, by definition, shareholders will be equally well off, 
in gross dollar terms, in both scenarios.
However, results indicate that shareholders would 
prefer the financial outcome of EDF's scenario because 
the quality of earnings in that scenario is improved.—^
See Appendix II, Tables 3 and 4. This improvement would bene­
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fit shareholders (and ratepayers as well) as a result of 
improved bond ratings and reduced financing costs. In 
addition, the EDF scenario reduces the risks to share­
holders of major construction delays, since it avoids 
dependence on large, central station facilities with 
long lead times.
C. FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY
The EDF scenario involves a level of direct con­
struction expenditures, not counting the Allowance for 
Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC), that is higher 
than the level of the utilities'plans. See Appendix II, 
Tables 5 and 6. Thus, it would appear that the EDF scenario 
is more expensive than the utilities’ scenario. This 
notion is incorrect, however, because it fails to measure 
the ultimate benefit to ratepayers from reduced financing 
costs (due to lower AFUDC) and reduced fuel costs.
The financial feasibility of the EDF scenario and 
the utilities' scenario can be evaluated by examining the 
detailed results of the computer simulation. The finan­
cial results indicate that the level of construction expen­
ditures in the EDF scenario is as readily supportable as 
the utilities' planned levels. First, AFUDC is signifi­
cantly lower in the EDF scenario. See Appendix II, Tables 
7 and 8. Second, key financial ratios show that the finan­
cial health of the utilities is at least as great under 
the EDF scenario as under the utilities' scenario.
Internal financing as a portion of total construction 
expenditures is as great under the EDF scenario, as compared 
to the utilities' plan. See Appendix II, Tables 9 and 10. 
Bond interest coverage--utility operating income as a 
multiple of bond interest payments--is at least as great
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in the EDF scenario as compared to the utilities' scenario. 
See Appendix II, Tables 11 and 12.
D. ADDITIONAL SCENARIO: COAL PLUS ALTERNATIVES
A computer simulation was made for an additional 
scenario in which the utilities' planned coal development 
takes place along with some development of alternatives.
Two alternatives are developed (cogeneration and end-use 
efficiency measures), and the level of oil and gas use is 
reduced even further in the 1990s than in the utilities 
scenario or the EDF scenario.-^
The purpose of analyzing this scenario is to investi­
gate what would happen if a combination of coal development 
and alternatives is used, in order to achieve a very 
high level of oil and gas reduction. It is generally 
assumed that oil and gas reduction results in financial 
benefits. However, developing this scenario turns out 
to cost ratepayers an extra $600 million in 1980 present- 
value over the 1980-1992 period, as compared to the EDF 
scenario; and it is actually more expensive than 
the utilities' scenario as well.—  ̂ In other words, using 
coal development to achieve very high levels of oil and 
gas reduction can be financially counter-productive.
The results of this scenario indicate there is a 
necessary choice which must be made, between the utilities' 
planned coal development and development of preferred 
alternatives. Both together are a poor financial option.
E* ADDITIONAL SCENARIO; LOW FUEL COSTS FOR COAL
This scenario accepts the utilities' estimate of coal 
fuel costs (including inflation) for the AWV Energy System.
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This results in a lower cost for ratepayers than the EDF 
scenario (in 1980 present value terms). Life-cycle 
analysis indicates this scenario has a cost advantage in 
the long term of $600 million in 1980 present value 
(although in the 1980-1992 period this scenario costs 
ratepayers $300 million more than the EDF scenario).
These results depend entirely on the utilities' 
estimated fuel costs. The estimated coal costs for the 
AWV Energy System in 1986 are 13% to 37% lower than the 
utilities' estimates for their other coal projects.-^
In addition, the utilities' estimates of annual coal fuel 
inflation rates for the AWV Energy System are 1.1% below 
the coal fuel inflation rates for their other coal pro­
jects and . 77o below their estimates of general inflation. 
The current utility fuel cost estimates for the AWV Energy
System are implausible, and recognized by the utilities
8 /themselves as highly speculative.- Therefore, the 
utilities' present planning seems to be based to a large 
degree on unrealistically optimistic assumptions with 
regard to fuel costs for the AWV Energy System.
Footnotes
1/ A discount rate of 127» is used, which is the same 
discount rate used by SCE and PG&E in Appl. 59308.
2/ Life-cycle benefits of EDF's scenario are $150 million 
in 1980 present value terms. These net benefits, 
however, are not distributed evenly to both SCE and PG&E. 
There is a net benefit to SCE of $200 million, while 
there is a net cost to PG&E of $50 million. The 
Technical Appendix describes how these life-cycle costs 
are calculated.
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3/ Over the economic life of the utilities' planned coal
— projects, the present value of revenues required to 
support these projects is approximately $10 billion, 
based on a 1985 levelized cost of 15.6 cents/kWh 
(Additional Testimony of W.M. Gardner, CPUC Appl. 59038/ 
Exh. 71), a 30 year economic life, and a 127a discount 
rate.
4/ Quality of earnings measures that portion of reported 
earnings which is cash, excluding Allowance For 
Funds Used During Construction which is a non-cash 
item.
5/ SCE's oil and gas use in 1992 is 19.2 million barrels 
and PG&E's is 1.5 million barrels (excluding 
cogeneration) under this scenario. Including co­
generation the figures are 28.3 and 11.4 million 
barrels for SCE and PG&E, respectively.
6/ The additional costs are $250 million for SCE's customers, 
and $350 million for PG&E's. Life-cycle analysis shows 
that these results hold over the economic lives of the 
proposed projects. Present-value costs through the 
year 2015 are $800 million greater in this scenario 
(coal plus alternatives) than in the EDF scenario 
($400 million for SCE and $400 million for PG&E).
7/ This comparison is made on the basis of cost per kilo­
watt-hour, which takes account of differences in coal 
quality and heat rate. See the Technical Appendix,
Table 1.
8/ See CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr. 1555-66 and 1613.
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V. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE 
ALLEN-WARNER VALLEY ENERGY SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
There are several regulatory and political obstacles 
to development of the AWV Energy System as proposed.—^
The existence of these obstacles raises serious questions 
about the wisdom of relying on this project as a potential 
source of electric power in the proposed time frame, as 
well as about ultimate project costs.
The two most significant unresolved issues surrounding 
the AWV Energy System are (1) impairment of vital water 
supplies in Utah, and (2) the adverse effect of the project 
on Bryce Canyon and Zion National Parks.
The available data suggest that the project as pro­
posed would have serious effects on both the quality and 
quantity of surface and groundwater resources in south­
western Utah. The Division of Water Rights of the Utah 
Department of Natural Resources has stated unequivocally 
that it will not grant water rights for the mine and slurry
line "if there is known or even suspected interference
2 /possible" with existing water rights.—
The data also suggest that the project would adversely 
affect both Bryce Canyon and Zion National Parks. The 
National Park Service has made clear its very serious con­
cerns about any impairment of these unique national trust 
lands.If y
In the following sections, the AWV Energy System and 
some of its major components are described, and the most 
significant obstacles to the development of the project as
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a reliable and economic source of electric energy are 
discussed.—^
Footnotes
1/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management 
"Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement," June 1980. The unresolved issues 
are discussed on pp. S-16 through S-18.
2/ Letter from Gerald W. Stoker, Area Engineer, Utah 
Department of Natural Resources Division of Water 
Rights to J. Kent Giles, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 
June 30, 1977. Appendix 14, U.S. Dept, of Interior,
Ibid.
3/ Letter from Glen T. Bean, Regional Director, Rocky Mountain 
Region, National Park Service to William Curtiss and 
David Mastbaum, November 28, 1979. Included in the 
Technical Appendix to this report.
4/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land 
Management, op. cit.
5/ Supplemental material explaining the technical issues 
in more detail is contained in the Technical Appendix.
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B. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The AWV Energy System is a joint proposal by Southern 
California Edison Co., Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Nevada 
Power Co., and the city of St. George, Utah, to develop 
2500 MW of coal-fired capacity in Utah and N e v a d a . I t  
includes a large surface and underground coal mine near 
Bryce Canyon National Park (Alton mine), two coal slurry 
pipelines (one approximately 75 miles long to the Warner 
Valley site and one approximately 185 miles long to the 
Harry Allen site) , an off-stream reservoir with a storage 
capacity of 55,000 acre feet, near St. George, Utah, and two 
generating complexes (Warner Valley, a 500 MW plant near 
Zion National Park and Harry Allen, a 2000 MW plant in 
Southern Nevada).
The Alton Mine
The proposed Alton coal mine extends to within two miles 
of Bryce Canyon National Park. The most recent information
indicates that 707, of the coal would be surface-mined and
2 /307, would be extracted using underground methods— with 
approximately 10,000 acres disturbed by surface mining 
operations.
Development of the mine is dependent, in part, on the 
regulatory and political acceptability of the hydrologic, 
erosional, and esthetic consequences of mining in the Alton 
area. And these consequences are related, in part, to the 
success or failure of efforts to reclaim the mined area 
in accordance with existing federal standards. Evaluation 
of the soils , vegetation and climatic conditions at Alton 
suggests that reclamation, if possible, would be very 
expensive.
The Alton area's soils pose a major obstacle to reclam­
ation. Successful reclamation requires stockpiling and re-
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spreading surface soils in order to establish a "diverse, 
effective and permanent vegetative c o v e r . T h e  physical 
and chemical characteristics of both topsoils and over­
burden in the area suggest that there' is an inadequate supply 
of material that is suitable for revegetation. Among the 
physical and chemical problems are high clay content, high 
sodium content, high salt concentrations, high pH, low 
available moisture holding capacity and low phosphorus 
availability.
Precipitation in the Alton area averages only about 
16 inches per year, and is very sporadic. The U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation concluded on the basis of a precipitation 
frequency analysis that without irrigation, revegetation 
efforts would fail about one-third of the time and have an 
even chance of success another third of the time.—  ̂ The 
quality of water available for irrigation ranges from 
moderate to poor, and would decline as a result of raining 
operations.—^
The actual reclamation costs for the Alton field are 
difficult to estimate, since a mine and reclamation plan 
are not available. It is likely, however, that these costs 
would be higher than at other surface mines in the West.
Seventy to ninety percent of reclamation costs are attributable8 /to earthmoving and grading.— Since parts of the Alton 
field are relatively steep and dissected by streams, the 
earthmoving and regrading costs would be higher at Alton 
than at most other western mines.
A combination of sporadic but intense precipitation, 
steep slopes, and relatively impermeable soils makes the 
Alton area particularly vulnerable to hydrologic damage.
During mining operations, soils and overburden would be 
temporarily stockpiled. These piles, along with the re­
graded but unreclaimed areas would be vulnerable to increased
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wind and water erosion. The various kinds of mining-related 
surface disturbances (removal of vegetation, surface strip­
ping, road construction,and regrading) would increase storm- 
flow peaks—  ̂ by both decreasing infiltration capacity and 
decreasing the concentration time for storm runoff.
Increased stormflow peaks and sediment discharge down­
stream from the mine area could increase channel and bank 
erosion in Johnson and Kanab Creeks. This could result 
in the destruction of portions of alluvial terraces along 
those creeks that are presently used for agriculture. In­
creased discharge of fine-grained sediment would also seal 
the beds of streams intersecting the Navajo Sandstone 
aquifer, resulting in a decrease in groundwater recharge.— ^
Mining in the Alton area would permanently destroy 
22 springs in the area of the mine, and alter the flow and 
quality of nearby springs.—  ̂ These springs are essential 
for wildlife and livestock. Their loss would be difficult 
if not impossible to mitigate.
Surface mining at Alton would also have an adverse 
effect on visitor experience at Bryce Canyon National Park. 
Recent tests have shown that blasting at the mine site would 
be audible throughout the Park and would be disturbing to 
Park visitors.—  Much of the surface mine itself would 
be visible from Yovimpa Point, an overlook visited by more 
than 100,000 people yearly.—  ̂ Visibility from Yovimpa 
Point could be reduced by dust from the mine by as much as 
45 miles under some conditions.—  ̂ Park Service policy is
to protect visibility in National Parks from any perceptible
_ 15/16/ impairment. —  —
Many of these issues concerning the proposed Alton mine 
are discussed, in detail, in the petition filed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund and others, including several 
local farmers and ranchers, with the U.S. Department of the 
Interior's Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement.
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This petition asks that the Alton area be declared unsuitable
17/for surface coal mining operations.—  If even a portion 
of the proposed mine area is declared unsuitable, the 
economics of the AWV Energy System, as proposed, would 
become less favorable.
The Coal Slurry Pipeline
Alton coal would be transported from the mine to the 
generating plants by two slurry lines. A 12-inch line 
would run approximately 75 miles from the Alton area to the 
Warner Valley site and a parallel 22-inch line would run 
approximately 185 miles to the Allen site.
The most serious water-related impediment to the AWV 
Energy System is the effect of pumping approximately 9700 
acre-feet per year from the Navajo Sandstone aquifer in 
the Alton area to supply the coal slurry pipeline and prep­
aration plant. This is the only source of water for the 
slurry.
The Navajo Sandstone is a large regional aquifer that 
outcrops in a broad band south of the proposed mine area.
It dips slightly toward the north and is dissected near 
the proposed mine area by southward flowing streams, chiefly 
the Virgin River, Kanab Creek, and Johnson Canyon. The main 
recharge area for the aquifer is probably in the upper reaches 
of these streams.—  The groundwater in the Navajo Sandstone 
generally moves south, reemerging in springs and seeps to 
feed the lower reaches of the same streams. The community 
of Kanab, Utah and the farms at the mouth of Johnson Canyon 
are dependent on the flow of springs and wells that tap 
the Navajo Sandstone.—  ̂ The crucial issue is the effect of 
pumping the well field over the life of the project on the 
supply of water to springs, streams, and wells five to 
fifteen miles south of the project area.
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The U.S. Geological Survey recently completed a study 
on groundwater conditions in the Alton area.—  ̂ This study 
used data from existing wells to determine the hydrologic 
characteristics of the Navajo Sandstone. Using conservative 
values for aquifer properties, this study indicates that 
pumping to supply the coal slurry could cause a lowering 
of the water table of 60 feet at a distance of 10 miles 
after 27 years. A drawdown of this magnitude would decrease 
the flow of springs, wells and streams in Johnson Canyon 
and Kanab Creek. The area of drawdown could also intersect 
the groundwater divide between the Kanab drainage and drain­
ages of the Sevier and Paria Rivers, causing a shift in 
groundwater from the latter basins to the former. It could 
reach the groundwater basin of the East Fork of the Virgin 
River, decreasing the summer low-flow in that stream.— '
The East Fork of the Virgin River passes through Zion National 
Park, and helps maintain streamflow that supports the 
endangered woundfin minnow.
Aside from decreasing the flow of springs and wells 
that presently tap the Navajo Sandstone, groundwater pumping 
could also decrease the quality of both groundwater and 
surface water.—  This would occur because pumping would 
draw more mineralized water from underlying and overlying 
aquifers into the Navajo Sandstone, and increase the pro­
portion of more mineralized water in streamflow.
Long-term pumping from the Navajo Sandstone 
for the coal slurry could seriously impair the water supplies 
in the farming communities to the south of the proposed 
mine area. As previously noted, the state of Utah has 
indicated that an application to appropriate water for the 
Alton mine project will not be granted if there is even a 
suspected possibility of interference with existing wells.
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The Warner Valley Water Project
Cooling and other water for the Warner Valley generating 
plant would be supplied by the proposed Warner Valley water 
project. This would consist of a diversion dam on the Virgin 
River, an off-stream reservoir with an annual yield of about 
32,600 acre feet (ac.ft.) and a delivery system. The 
plant would use a maximum of 10,000 ac.ft./year, and 8,000 
ac.ft./yr. would be used for supplemental irrigation.
Present supply systems for local communities for domestic 
and other purposes are more than adequate for the next 
20 to 40 years.—  Thus the annual yield of the system 
would be at least 14,600 acre feet in excess of the projected 
demand.
This water system would have adverse effects on both 
water quality and flow regimes in the Virgin River. Flow 
in the river below the diversion would be reduced 38% on 
an annual basis and over 50% during winter and spring. Of 
the 265,000 tons of sediment diverted in an average year,
53,000 tons would be returned to the river. The average 
annual sediment concentration in the river would be increasedo / j
by as much as 807o.— ' Reduced flow, especially in a segment
of the river affected by mineral springs, would increase
the concentration of dissolved solids and increase tem-
25/perature extremes.—
Reduction of flows in the Virgin River would adversely 
affect the endangered woundfin minnow and the Virgin River 
roundtail chub which has been proposed as an endangered species. 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in its official biologi­
cal opinion on the effects of the project, stated that:
...The Warner Valley project as now 
proposed will be likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of the endan­
gered woundfin by adversely modifying 
its present habitat in the Virgin 
River. The habitat is considered 
essential for survival of the species
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and has been proposed for designation 
as "Critical Habitat" as provided for 
by the Endangered Species Act of 1973....£2/
The Washington County Water Conservancy District has not 
agreed to the minimum flow releases deemed necessary by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.—  ̂ The BL1! has stated that 
the water project would adversely affect the habitat of 
the roundtail chub, but the Fish and Wildlife Service has 
not yet issued its official opinion on that fish.— '
The Warner Valley Power Plant
The proposed 500 MW Warner Valley power plant would
be located approximately 17 miles west of Zion National Park
and about 13 miles southeast of St. George, Utah. The
available evidence and modeling studies show that the
Warner Valley power plant would exceed existing air quality
standards. Sulfur dioxide emissions from the plant would
exceed the allowable increment under the federal prevention
of significant deterioration (PSD) program. This would
occur for both Class II areas in the vicinity of the plant
29 /and for the Class I area of Zion National Park.—  Under
certain conditions a yellow-brown haze from the plant would
30 /be visible from points within Zion National Park.—
The resulting reduction in visibility would be a violation
31/of established Park Service policy.—
The Warner Valley power plant could also adversely
32 /affect two species of endangered plants.—  The solid waste 
disposal area would destroy habitat and 80 to 100 individuals 
of the Siler pincushion cactus. The only known habitat of 
the endangered dwarf bearclaw poppy would be disrupted by 
the construction and operation of the Warner Valley plant 
and water project. One of the two existing populations 
of this species occurs near existing roads between St.
George, Utah, and the power plant site; accelerated population
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growth and road use would pose an immediate threat to this 
species. Construction of the slurry pipeline near 
St. George would destroy some individual plants of both 
of these species.—
The Allen Plant
The proposed 2000 MW Allen power plant would be 
located in Dry Lake, approximately 25 miles northeast of 
Las Vegas, Nevada. The plant would emit 41 tons per day 
of sulfur dioxide, 8.2 tons per day of particulates and 
136 tons per day of nitrogen oxides. Sulfur dioxide 
emissions from the plant would exceed the Class II PSDO / J
increment near the plant.— ' The Class I sulfur dioxide 
increment would be exceeded in the potential Class I Valley 
of Fire State Park. The plant would also cause plume 
blight and reductions in visible range in the Piute 
Primitive Area and Valley of Fire State Park. Emissions 
from the Allen plant would exacerbate existing air quality 
problems associated with the Reid Gardner plant and city 
of Las Vegas.— ^
The Clark County Health District has raised a number
of issues regarding the air quality impacts of the Allen/plant.—  Among these are: (1) the cooling towers will
release ammonium, which will react with sulfate to produce 
aerosols and reduce visibility more than previous estimates 
indicate; (2) short-term increases in nitrogen oxides could 
exacerbate ozone problems in Las Vegas as well as visibility 
problems; (3) current reliability estimates for air pollution 
control equipment are overly optimistic. A more realistic 
appraisal of equipment reliability would yield more pes­
simistic estimates of potential air quality problems.
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Footnotes
1/ The generating capacity of the system will be shared 
among the participants as follows:
Nevada Power Co. 285 MW
Southern California Edison Co. 1045 MW
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 1045 MW
City of St. George 125 MW
U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management 
"Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement," June 1980, p. S-l.
2/ Utah International, Inc., Fact Sheet, Alton Project,
June 1980.
3/ 30 U.S.C.§ 1265 (b)(19); 30 C.F.R. §816.111.
4/ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Bureau of Land Manage­
ment, and U.S. Geological Survey, "Energy Mineral Rehabil­
itation Inventory and Analysis." Alton Coal Field,
Kane County, Utah," 1975.
5/ Utah International, Inc., "Environmental Assessment, 
Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System, Vol. 5, Alton Coal 
Field," 1975.
6/ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, op.cit.
7/ U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, 
Development of Coal Resources in Southern Utah, Final 
Environmental Statement, Part 2, Site Specific Analysis.
8/ Daniel Weiner, Reclaiming the West: The Coal Industry
and Surface-Mined Lands, Inform, Inc. New York, NY, p.377.
9/ T. Verma, "Stripmining and Hydrologic Environment on 
Black Mesa." in L. Thomas, ed., Reclamation and Use 
of Disturbed Land in the Southwest, University of 
Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1977, pp. 161-166.
This study showed much higher volumes and stormflow 
peaks in the mined and regraded watershed than in the 
undisturbed control area.
10/ G.W. Sandberg, "Hydrologic Evaluation of the Alton
Reclamation Study Site, Alton Coal Field, Utah." U.S. 
Geological Survey Open-File Report 79-346, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 1979, p. 53.
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11/ U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey, 
op.cit.
12/ Personal communication with Keith Kirk, U.S. Office of 
Surface Mining and Enforcement, July 1980.
13/ U.S. Department of the Interior Geological Survey, 
op.cit., p. A-II-19. The figure of 100,000 visitors 
is for 1976.
14/ Michael Williams, "Affidavit in support of the Petition 
Before the Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement 
Designating Certain Federal Lands in Kane and Garfield 
Counties, Utah, Abutting Bryce Canyon National Park 
and Dixie National Forest as Unsuitable for Surface 
Coal Mining Operation," Berkeley, California, November 
1979.
15/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Manage­
ment, op.cit.
16/ Letter from Glen T. Bean, Regional Director, Rocky 
Mountain Region, National Park Service to William 
Curtiss and David Mastbaum, November 28, 1979. Included 
in the Technical Appendix to this report.
17/ Environmental Defense Fund, et al., "Petition Before
the Office of Surface Mining and Enforcement Designating 
Certain Federal Lands in Kane and Garfield Counties, Utah, 
Abutting Bryce Canyon National Park and Dixie National 
Forest as Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining Operations," 
Berkeley, California, November 1979.
18/ H.D. Goode, "Reconnaissance of Water Resources of a 
Part of Western Kane County, Utah," Utah Geological 
and Mineral Survey and Utah Water and Power Board,
Water Resources Bulletin 5, 1964, p.62.
19/ R.M. Cordova, "Groundwater Conditions in the Upper Virgin 
River and Kanab Creek Basins Area,Utah, With Emphasis on 
the Navajo Sandstone," U.S. Geological Survey Open-File 
Report 80-524-W, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1980, p. 121.
20/ Ibid.
21/ Personal communication with Thomas Schultz, U.S. Office 
of Surface Mining and Enforcement, July, 1980.
22/ Cordova, op.cit.




26/ H. Willoughby. Memorandum to State Director, Bureau of 
Land Management, from Regional Director, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Denver, Colorado, regarding the effects 
of the Allen-Warner Valley Energy System, 1978. Included 
as Appendix 13, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau 
of Land Management, op.cit.
27/ U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Manage­
ment op.cit.
28/ Ibid.
29/ Environmental Protection Agency, "Screening Modeling of 
Harry Allen Powerplant using the VALLEY Model," Region 
IX, San Francisco, California, 1978.
30/ M.D. Williams, "Warner Valley Visibility Analysis-- 
Zion Plume Blight," National Park Service, Air Office, 
Denver Service Center, Denver, Colorado, 1980.






36/ Letter from Michael Naylor, Director of Air Pollution 
Control Division, Clark County Health District, Las 
Vegas, Nevada, to District Manager, Cedar City District, 
Bureau of Land Management, July 17, 1980.
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VI. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
The individual components of the EDF scenario, both 
end-use efficiency improvements (non-generation resources), 
and preferred generation resources are discussed below.
The consequences of developing these components have been 
evaluated by simulating their combined use in the electric 
systems of SCE and PG&E. There are two distinct aspects 
to this simulation: (1) economic parameters (e .g ., capital
costs and economic lives) and (2) technical parameters 
(e .g ., energy production and reliability).
The economic simulation of end-use efficiency improve­
ments treats these alternatives analogously to the utilities' 
generation facilities The utilities bear the full costs 
of these efficiency measures and subsequently recover these 
costs from their customers in the same manner they recover 
costs for conventional facilities. The analysis accounts 
for differences in tax treatment between non-generation 
measures and power generation facilities.—  ̂ With respect 
to potential differences in accounting and ratemaking treat­
ment, the analysis assumes a "worst case," e.g., neither the
of subsidiary project financing to lower financing costs 
of residential end-use efficiency improvements, nor tne use
of special ratemaking treatments such as a balancing 
account (similar to the Energy Cost Adjustment Clause) . 
are considered. By using this "worst case" assumption, the 
results of this analysis are not tied to any particular 
scheme of collecting the costs of improved-efficiency 
measures. This means the results of the analysis remain 
valid regardless of how regulatory policy issues associated
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with the distribution of costs and benefits among rate­
payers are ultimately resolved.
The economic simulation of the preferred generation 
resources is straightforward: The alternatives are treated
on par with the utilities’ conventional investments. The 
utilities bear the full costs of these facilities and 
subsequently recover these costs from their customers.
The technical simulation of end-use efficiency improve­
ments is performed by estimating the reductions in load, 
both for energy and peak, that result from development of 
these efficiency improvements. Details of the estimates 
are given in the Technical Appendix.
The technical simulation of preferred generation re­
sources, on the other hand, is analogous to the production 
simulation employed for the utilities' conventional genera­
ting units. The operating characteristics and availability 
of the alternative resources is taken into account. For 
example, EDF's analysis assumes that maintenance of co­
generation units cannot be scheduled in an optimal manner.
The random availability of wind generation is accounted for 
by assuming average random availability at all times (despite
evidence that wind generation will have greater than average
2 /availability at times of system peak— ).
Footnotes
1J EDF's analysis assumes that no utility tax credit 
nor accelerated depreciation are available for those 
non-generation alternatives which are not utility- 
owned.
2/ See testimony of R.B. Williams (CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr.
“ 2250:12-16, and 2770:5-8).
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B. NON-GENERATION ALTERNATIVES
The EDF scenario includes a number of measures to 
improve the efficiency with which electricity is used.
These measures, which affect end-use efficiency in the 
residential, commercial, and agricultural sectors, are 
described in the following sections.
All of these measures achieve efficiency gains beyond 
those forecast by the utilities themselves and by the 
California Energy Commission in its 1979 Biennial Report.
These additional measures do not exhaust the possibilities 
for increased end-use efficiency, since only those savings 
which could be accurately quantified using existing data 
have been included. With more complete data on each sector, 
the number of measures and the concomitant electricity 
savings could be expanded. For example, commercial build­
ing lighting improvements, or additional conservation 
voltage regulation programs ("Phase II") have not been 
included in the EDF scenario.
The CPUC has adopted the electricity sales forecast 
prepared by the California Energy Commission in the 1979 
Biennial Report as a basis for determining need for the 
AWV Energy System,—  ̂ This forecast provides a complete 
breakdown of anticipated electricity consumption by individual 
end-uses. It accounts for many efficiency improvements that 
will occur as a result of state and federal lav;; most 
importantly it includes efficiency improvements that result 
from state and federal appliance efficiency standards and 
state building standards. In addition, the 1979 Biennial 
Report forecast takes into account, except as noted below, 
the impact on electricity use of existing utility-sponsored 
programs.
The implementation of the efficiency measures included 
in the EDF scenario is based largely on utility conservation
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financing proposals currently being considered by the 
CPUC. These recent proposals were not included in the 
1979 Biennial Report forecast.
1. RESIDENTIAL EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS
For the residential sector, the EDF scenario includes 
a set of measures to improve the efficiency of five end- 
uses of electricity: (a) space heating; (b) water heating;
(c) air conditioning; (d) lighting; and (e) refrigeration. 
None of these measures involves a lifestyle change. All 
of the measures are in addition to the projected efficiency 
improvements that are already included in the California 
Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial Report forecast.
Table 2 summarizes the 1992 savings in each of the five 
end-uses resulting from this set of efficiency improvements. 
The measures to accomplish these improvements are described 
below. Sample calculations are included in the Technical 
Appendix.
(a) Space Heating
The EDF scenario includes the following five measures 
for electrically heated single-family homes: sealing attic
bypasses; adding storm windows; caulking; additional R-19 
insulation in attics; and weatherstripping. Estimated 
savings are based only on single-family homes of 1980 vintage 
or older remaining in 1992. Although large potential 
savings exist in multifamily dwellings and mobile homes, 
as well as in improved design and construction of new homes, 
they are not included because data to document these savings 
are not yet available.
Average costs and savings for SCE and PG&F for each 
retrofit measure are shown in Table 3.
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TABLE 2
1992 Residential Energy Savings From End-Use Efficiency 



















Average Costs and Energy Savings 
of Space Heating Retrofit Measures
Average cost Average energy savings
per retrofit (kWh/year)*
(1980 $) PG&E SCE
Seal attic bypasses 75 463 357
Storm windows 580 1311 1009
Caulking 220 520 400
Additional insulation 470 430 330
Weatherstripping 200 237 183
*Wright, et al. estimate 30% more energy for heating in 
NorthernTaTTfornia than in Southern California. The 
savings are adjusted accordingly.
Source:
Janice Wright, et_ al., "Supplying Energy Through 
Greater Efficiency: TKe Potential for Energy Conserva­
tion in California's Residential Sector," Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory (draft), 1980.
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It is assumed that 60% of the electrically heated
1980-vintage and older single-family houses remaining in
1992 are retrofit with each measure, except "additional insula-
2 /tion" for which the portion retrofitted is 48%.- "Seal 
attic bypasses" refers to identifying and eliminating air 
circulation paths which reduce the effectiveness of existing 
attic insulation. "Additional insulation" refers to adding 
another layer of R-19 insulation onto the existing attic 
insulation. Caulking and weatherstripping serve to reduce 
infiltration from small leaks, and around windows and doors. 
Adding storm windows increases the low thermal resistance 
of single-pane glass.
Calculations of savings and costs are contained in the 
Technical Appendix.
(b) Water Heating
The EDF scenario includes two measures that reduce the 
use of electricity for domestic water heating: solar water
heaters and heat-pump water heaters. Estimated savings 
are based on retrofitting 25% of single- and multifamily 
electric water heaters with solar units and 55% with heat- 
pimp units by 1991. The CPUC-ordered demonstration program 
for utility financing of solar units (Oil 42), that will 
result in retrofit of 10%, of existing electric water heaters by 
1983 has been included in both the utility and EDF scenarios 
as an additional program that was not accounted for in the 
California Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial Report forecast.
Solar water heaters save approximately 60% of the 
electricity used for domestic hot w a t e r . C o s t s  are 
$3000 per single-family unit and $1000 per multifamily 
unit.— Savings from heat pimp water heaters are approxi­
mately 507o.—  ̂ The average cost is $700 per installation.—^
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(c) Air Conditioning
The EDF scenario includes one measure for single­
family homes with central air conditioning: retrofitting
walls with R-11 insulation. This measure reduces central 
air conditioning unit energy consumption by 17%, on average, 
without changing the comfort of retrofit homes.- Estimated 
savings are based on retrofit of 42% of centrally air 
conditioned homes of 1980 vintage or older remaining in 
1992.-^ The average cost of this measure is $270.-
(d) Lighting
The EDF scenario includes a variety of light bulb 
retrofit measures to improve the efficiency of residential 
lighting. They are: (1) replacing incandescent bulbs in
older kitchens with higher efficiency fluorescent bulbs;
(2) replacing exterior incandescent bulbs with screw-in 
fluorescent units; (3) replacing 2-Way lights with screw-in 
fluorescents and "Halarc" bulbs; and (4) replacing 75 Watt 
and 100 Watt interior incandescent bulbs with fluorescent 
bulbs.—  ̂The percentage of homes assumed to be retrofitted 
ranges from 15%, to 48%, depending on the measure.— ^
Savings are estimated statewide and adjusted for SCE and PG&E 
according to each utility's share of residential customers. 
Average cost per home varies, according to the number of 
bulbs retrofit.
Calculations of savings and costs are provided in the 
Technical Appendix.
(e) Refrigeration
The EDF scenario contains two measures for increasing 
the efficiency of refrigeration in residences: (1) a program
to remove under-utilized second refrigerators; and (2) an 
incentive program for purchases of refrigerators which are
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more efficient than existing state and federal standards.
To remove under-utilized second refrigerators, SCE
and PG&E have begun pilot programs of bounties, paid to
12 /customers for their second refrigerators.—  The EDF 
scenario provides for a bounty of $80 and assumes that with 
such an incentive 307* of second refrigerators will be 
collected.
For purchases of more efficient refrigerators, the 
incentive program in the EDF scenario provides an incentive 
of $30 for each refrigerator purchased from 1982-1992 which 
is as efficient as the most efficient refrigerator being 
marketed in 1980. This incentive is more than double the 
average premimum that customers must now pay for top effi­
ciency (i .e ., the cost differential between those refrig­
erators which meet current appliance efficiency standards,
13/and the most efficient available models.)—  Savings are 
based on the assumption that only half of the full potential 
savings under the program are realized.
A more detailed discussion of both refrigerator programs, 
including calculations, is presented in the Technical 
Appendix.
Footnotes
1/ CPUC Decision 91968 (1980).
2/ Percentage based on estimates of eligibility in Janice 
Wright, et al., "Supplying Energy Through Greater 
Efficiency: The Potential for Energy Conservation in
California's Residential Sector," Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory (draft), 1980. For details see the Technical 
Appendix.
3/ Actual^ figures range from 567» in PG&E's area to 767, 
in SCE's. California Energy Commission, "Technical 
Documentation of the Residential Sales Forecasting 
Model: Electricity and Natural Gas," October 1979,Appendix L.
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4/ These estimates are used by both SCE and PG&E in their 
compliance filings for CPUC Order Instituting Investi­
gation (Oil) No. 42 Decision 19272. See OII-42/Exh.
57-G (SCE) and Exh. 70 (PG&E).
5/ As reported by SCE in OII-42/Exh. 57-G.
6/ SCE estimates costs of $600-$700. Ibid.
7/ Wright et al., op.cit., Appendix 3, p.25.
8/ Based on estimates of eligibility in Wright et al. , 
op.cit.
9/ Total cost of the measure is $900; however, 707„ of the 
cost is assigned to gas space heating savings. (See 
the Technical Appendix) Wright et al., op.cit.
10/ Savings vary greatly according to the number of hours 
per year a particular bulb operates. Wright et al. , 
op.cit., consider usage frequency for eight different 
household lights.
11/ Based on estimates of eligibility in Wright et al. , 
op.cit.
12/ Incentives for customers were $25 under the PG&E program 
and $65 under the SCE program, with additional payments 
to the charity or contractor collecting the refrigerators. 
For details see the Technical Appendix.
13/ Wright et al., op.cit.
-43-
2. COMMERCIAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY MEASURES
Although studies have reported that a large potential 
exists for increased efficiency in commercial electricity 
use, there are insufficient data refined enough to be used 
in a systematic analysis such as EDF's.—  ̂ For that reason 
the EDF scenario includes only one efficiency measure in 
the commercial sector.
That measure is the replacement of electric water 
heaters in commercial buildings with heat pump water heaters.
This measure saves about 507, of electric consumption for
2 /water heating in the average commercial building.— The 
EDF scenario assumes that 30% of commercial buildings with 
electric water heating will convert to heat pumps under the 
program.
Energy savings are 264 GWh/year in 1992 for SCE and 
308 GWh/year for PG&E. The Technical Appendix provides 
detailed cost and savings calculations.
Footnotes
1/ A report to PG&E by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Conserva­
tion Potential in the PG6cE Service Area, June 1980, 
concludes that large potential savings exist for a 
number of commercial end-uses of electricity, in­
cluding lighting, refrigeration, water heating, and 
space heating and cooling. As an example, for space 
heating and cooling, potential reductions by 1990 in 
energy intensity below 1975 levels for existing commercial 
buildings are, on average, 327, and 407, respectively.
For new commercial buildings the potential reductions 
were even greater: 597, for space heating and 487, for
cooling. A.D. Little, Table IV-14, pp.IV-78, 79.
2/ Based on savings for heat pumps in the residential 
sector. For discussion, see the Technical Appendix.
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3. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS
Water pumping is the main end-use of electricity in 
the agricultural sector. Both SCE and PG&E have programs for 
testing and adjusting agricultural p u m p s . T h e  EDF scenario 
provides for expanding these programs. Over a three year 
period (1982-1984) about one-half of each utility's agricul­
tural pumping customers are reached by the expanded program. 
Energy savings are 94 GWh/year in 1992 for SCE and 468 GWh/year 
for PG&E. Savings and costs are derived from SCE's program 
and from the California Energy Commission's 1979 Biennial 
Report forecast, and are shown in the Technical Appendix.
Footnote
1/ CPUC, "Analysis of Energy Conservation Programs 
of Southern California Edison Company Test Year 
1981," April 11, 1980, p. 4-6. PG&E, "Report on 
1979 Energy Conservation Activities," March 31, 1980, 




Energy can be saved by increasing the efficiency 
of electricity distribution. Conservation voltage 
regulation--maintaining service voltages in the lower 
half of the 114 to 126 volt range--is one method; up­
grading the distribution network is another.
The EDF scenario includes only one measure to in­
crease distribution efficiency: expansion of PG&E's 
current distribution network upgrading program to con­
vert primary distribution feeders to 21-kilovolt operation. 
The effect of PG&E's current program is included in both 
the utility and EDF scenario as an additional measure 
that was not included in the 1979 Biennial Report.
PG&E's "Montezuma Study" notes that an additional 569 
distribution circuits could be upgraded.—  ̂ The EDF 
scenario expands PG&E's existing program to upgrade 
these additional circuits, resulting in additional 
savings of 290 GWh/year in 1991.—  ̂ Cost estimates are 
based entirely on PG&E's existing program. The Technical 
Appendix provides details.
EDF's scenario does not include any additional conser­
vation voltage regulation beyond existing programs ("Phase 
I") already included in the 1979 Biennial Report forecast. 
Although there is evidence that a significant amount of 
additional cost-effective savings is available,— data 
to quantify these savings are currently unavailable. There­




1/ PG&E, "Montezuma Power Plant Project Assessment 
Interim Report," May 2, 1980 (CPUC Appl. 59308/
Exh. 64), p. VII-26.
2/ Ibid., p. VII-62.
3/ San Diego Gas and Electric plans on spending $1.45 
million in 1981 on conservation voltage regulation 
Phase II programs. SCE, five times as large, is 
spending half that amount: proportional to size,
only one-tenth of SDG&E's program. For that reason, 
the CPUC staff has recommended that SCE triple its 
test-year 1981 projected Phase II spending, to 
$2.4 million. (CPUC Appl. 59351/Exh. H 6 ) .
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C. GENERATION ALTERNATIVES
The EDF scenario includes expansion of existing 
utility programs for four electric-generation technolo­
gies: geothermal, cogeneration, wind, and biomass. The
scenario does not represent the maximum amount of capacity 
that could be obtained from any of these power options; 
rather, it includes levels of capacity for each technology 
which can be reliably achieved by 1992.
Moreover, the set of generation options included 
in the EDF scenario does not exhaust the preferred 
generation alternatives available in the time frame under 
consideration. Expansion of hydroelectric generation 
through capacity additions at existing facilities, 
accelerated development of photovoltaics, and other 




In their current resource plans through 1992, PG&E-/ 
and SCE-/ project 2211 MW and 170 MW respectively of 
geothermal capacity. EDF's scenario includes an additional 
1279 MW in the same time period. Table 4 provides a 
year-by-year breakdown of capacity under each schedule.
The EDF scenario for PG&E adopts PG&E's planned dry 
steam geothermal additions at The Geysers through 1988, 
but includes 440 MW of dry steam capacity in addition to 
the 200 MW of PG&E hot water geothermal additions in 
1989-1992, for a total of 2651 MW.-/
For SCE, the EDF scenario adopts the company plan 
for 41 MW through 1983, then includes 839 MW of additional 
hot water capacity beyond the 129 MW planned by the company 
in 1984-1992, for a total of 1009 MW. All of EDF's pro­
posed additions to SCE's plan are hot water flash 
geothermal, with the alternative possibility of binary 
units after 1986. All units are at Imperial Valley 
locations.
For PG&E and SCE combined, the EDF scenario through 
1992 includes 3660 MW of geothermal, compared to 2381 MW 
now planned by the utilities.
Discussion
California's total geothermal potential is far higher 
than either the utility or EDF scenario through 1992.
The U.S. Geological Survey places the total electric energy 
in identified hydrothermal systems in California at
13,800 MW, and estimates that an accessible resource base
4/of even larger dimension remains undiscovered.— Thus, 
the only issue for resource planning purposes is that of 
dependable near-term and mid-term levels of geothermal 
capacity: what pace of development is practicable.
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TABLE 4-












1980 910 910 - -
1981 968 968 - -
1982 1241 1241 - -
1983 1406 1406 41 41
1984 1571 1571 50 150
1985 1571 1571 50 150
1986 1736 1736 59 159
1987 1791 1791 59 259
1988 2011 2011 96 409
1989 2061 2171 96 559
1990 2111 2331 170 709
1991 2161 2491 170 859
1992 2211 2651 170 1009
Sources:
PG&E -- CFH III, Form R-4A, June 1980.
SCE -- "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980
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Various studies— have evaluated the feasibility 
of accelerated schedules of geothermal development; a 
summary of the results of several of these is shown in 
Table 5. The yearly survey performed by the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) is particularly sig­
nificant since it is compiled from the utilities' own 
estimates of future additions. Table 6 shows the full 
results of the 1979 EPRI survey for California. Host 
notable is the gap between the "announced" and "probable" 
levels of development. This gap--between what the state's 
utilities have included in supply plans and the level of 
geothermal development they themselves consider "probable"-- 
amounts to 1765 MW by 1990 statewide, or 1200-1600 MW 
for PG&E and SCE.
Dry Steam
At The Geysers dry steam field, the EDF scenario
differs from the PG&E plan by including an additional
440 MW of dry steam capacity after 1988; this results
in a projection of 2451 MW of dry steam potential
through 1992. Independent assessments of the potential
of the dry steam field show that this additional dry8 /steam capacity is available at The Geysers.—
Hot Water
For The Geysers hot water field, the PG&E supply 
plan includes 200 MW of hot water geothermal capacity 
in 1989-1992. Although several studies have concluded 
that significantly higher amounts of hot water capacity 
could be operating at The Geysers by 1992— ,̂ the EDF 
scenario includes no additional capacity for PG&E at 
this location. Other hot water fields in Northern 
California, including Mono-Long Valley, Surprise Valley,
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TABLE 5
Recent Projections of Potential 
Geothermal Development 
(Geysers and Imperial Valley Locations Only)
(MW)
1985 1990
ci /Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1977)- 2508 4560
Interagency Geothermal Coordinating 
Council (1979)b/ 2670 4720
Electric Power Research 
Institute (1979)c/ 2154 3457
Environmental Defense Fund (1980) 1721 3040
Si /— See footnote 5.
-^See footnote 6.
—^This is the "Probable" forecast by California's 
utilities as reported by the Electric Power Research 
Institute (see footnote 7 and Table 6). The 1985 and 
1990 figures shown here have been reduced by 200 MW 
and 500 MW respectively to adjust the EPRI survey, which 
covered geothermal capacity statewide, to Geysers and 
Imperial Valley locations only.
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TABLE 6
1979 EPRI Utility Geothermal*Survey
California Capacity By Year 
(MW)













"Announced": "Either publicly or through PUC-type
biennial reports."
"Probable": Estimated by California utilities; 
"based on successful demonstration of 
technology for using liquid-dominated 
geothermal resources."
"Possible": Estimated by California utilities; 
"based additionally on removal of 
institutional barriers, governmental 
incentives and R&D support."
See footnote 7.
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and Glass Mountain, could also provide several hundred 
megawatts, with development beginning in the late 1980s.— ■ 
However, the EDF scenario assumes development at these 
locations is deferred until after 1992.
For Imperial Valley locations, the EDF scenario
through 1992 includes an additional 839 MW of hot water
capacity beyond the 170 MW in the SCE supply plan.
EDF's schedule of new units takes into account the
chief determinant of the pace of hot water capacity
increments--the need to allow a three year interval
between completion of the first commercial scale units
11/and operation of additional plants.—  To provide for 
the possibility of difficulties and delays at a particular 
location, the EDF scenario limits additions in any year 
to 150 MW, or one 50 MW unit at three out of the five 
Imperial Valley locations (Heber, Brawley, Salton Sea, 
Westmorland, and East Mesa).
The EPRI study notes that achieving the "probable"
level of development projected by the state's utilities
in the EPRI survey depends on "successful demonstration
of technology for using liquid-dominated geothermal
resources," i .e ., hot water geothermal.— ' According
to SCE, the major question associated with feasibility
of hot water geothermal technology in California is
adaptability of flash plants to the highly saline brines
13/encountered at some hot water fields.— '
Hot water geothermal technology is not new: plants
have operated for years in Italy (400 MW), Hew Zealand 
(190 MW), Mexico (150 MW), Turkey, the Philippines, El 
Salvador, the U.S.S.R., Iceland, and Japan.—  ̂ Salinity 
is not a constraint to the level of development in the 
EDF scenario, since most of California's hot water 
resource, including over 1000 MW at Imperial Valley sites, 
is in fields less saline than Mexico's Cerro Prieto
-54-
field, where the commercial hot water technology has 
been proven successful. For a more extensive discussion 
of the consequences of salinity for hot water geothermal 
development, see the Technical Appendix.
Costs and Technical Parameters
With the exception of capital cost and fuel cost 
for SCE's hot water geothermal plants, which are derived 
in the Technical Appendix, all assumptions regarding 
costs and technical parameters for geothermal are in 
agreement with estimates made by SCE and PGSsE.
Footnotes
1/ PGoE, CFll III, Form R-4, June 1980.
2/ SCE, "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
3/ Both the PG&E resource plan and the EDF scenario include 
a 53 Mtf NCPA unit in 1981, a 53 MW NCPA unit in 1982, 
a 55 MW SMUD unit in 1983, and a 55 MW SMUD unit in 1984.
4/ L.J.P. Muffler, ed., Assessment of Geothermal Resources 
of the United States -- 1978, U.S. Geological Survey 
Circular 790, 1979, Tables 4 and 8.
5/ C.D. Fredrickson, "Analysis of Requirements for Accelerating 
the Development of Geothermal Energy Resources in California," 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1977.
6/ Interagency Geothermal Coordinating Council, "Third 
Annual Report, Geothermal Energy Research Development 
6i Demonstration Program," March, 1979.
77 Vasel Roberts and Paul Kruger, Electric Power Research 
Institute, "Utility Industry Estimates of Geothermal 
Electricity," Geothermal Resources Council Transactions,
Vol. 3, September, 1979.
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8/ L.J.P. Muffler, op.cit.; California Energy Commission,
"Comparative Evaluation of Nontraditional Energy Resources," 
1980; Thomas A.V. Cassel e t a l . , "Geothermal Investment 
Analysis With Evaluation of California and Utah Resource 
Areas," Technecon Analytic Research, Inc. and the Univer­
sity of Pennsylvania, Oct. 1979; personal communication 
from L.J.P. Muffler, U.S.G.S., July 17, 1980; personal 
communication from David Hill, California Energy Commission, 
July 11, 1980. For discussion, see the Technical Appendix.
97 Fredrickson, op.cit.; Interagency Geothermal Coordinating 
Council, op.cit.; R. Trehan et al., Site Specific Analysis 
of Geothermal Development--Scenarios and Requirements.
Volume II, Mitre Corporation, April 1978.
10/ Cassel, op.cit.; Fredrickson, op.cit.; Interagency
Geothermal Coordination Counsel, op.cit.; Trehan, op.cit.
11/ Personal communication with Edward Ennis, California 
Energy Commission, Geothermal Division, June 20, 1980.
12/ Roberts and Kruger, op.cit.
13/ SCE and PG&E, "Proponents Environmental Assessment," 
Allen-Wamer Valley Energy System, 10.15.1.6. See also 
"Prepared Testimony of S.P. Barrett," (CPUC Appl. 59308/
Exh. 18 and Tr. 1183:17-19).
14/ "Tapping the Main Stream of Geothermal Energy," EPRI 
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, May 1980; and Ronald Di Pippo,
A Summary of the Technical Specifications of the Geo­
thermal Power Plants on the World, Revision 1, July 1979, 
cited in PG&E" "Montezuma Power Plant Assessment Interim 
Report," May 2, 1980 (CPUC Appl. 59308/Exh. 64).
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2. COGENERATION
Through 1992, PG&E-^ and SCE-^ project that 992 MW and 
374 MW respectively of new cogeneration will be added to 
their systems. For PG&E, this new cogeneration is entirely 
accounted for in the company's resource plan. SCE includes 
116 MW in its resource plan and 258 MW as a reduction in 
s a l e s ^
For PG&E, the EDF scenario through 1992 includes a total 
of 1719 MW of new cogeneration, 727 MW beyond the utility 
scenario. For SCE, the EDF scenario includes a total of 
1630 MW of new cogeneration, 1256 MW beyond the cogeneration 
included in the utility scenario.
Table 7 provides a year-by-year comparison of total 
cogeneration for the utilities' scenario and the EDF scenario.
Table 8 provides a breakdown of 1992 cogeneration 
capacity under each scenario into two categories: (1) commercial
and industrial cogeneration, and (2) cogeneration in thermal 
enhanced heavy oil recovery operations.
Discussion
The primary issues in determining dependable levels of 
near-term and mid-term cogeneration capacity are the total 
economic potential in a given utility's service area, and 
how much of the potential can be realized in light of 
institutional constraints. Perhaps the single most important 
factor is the degree of utility and regulatory commitment 
to cogeneration development. Although cogeneration technology 
is well established, providing as much as 10 percent of 
the electric energy in countries such as West Germany, 
utility practices in the United States have inhibited the 
development of this country's enormous cogeneration potential.
At present, public policy in the U.S. is shifting toward 
encouragement of cogeneration due to mounting recognition
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TABLE 7












1979 179 179 20 20
1980 204 204 21 21
1981 221 221 55 55
1982 273 273 90 90
1983 335 431 133 168
1984 398 563 161 246
1985 821 911 199 324
1986 871 1107 259 502
1987 921 1239 277 860
1988 971 1371 303 1038
1989 1021 1502 321 1316
1990 1071 1634 342 1494
1991 1121 1766 369 1572
1992 1171 1898 394 1650
Sources:
PG&E -- CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1930.
SCE —  "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10,1980.
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TABLE 8
Cogeneration Capacity in 1992 










Utility Scenario 394 -
EDF Scenario 870 780
^Includes firm and nonfirm cogeneration
Sources:
PG&E —  CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1980.
SCE -- "Summary of Loads and Resources, June 10, 1980.
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of the inherent efficiency of the technology. The Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 removed the most 
significant constraint to cogeneration by requiring 
purchase of cogenerated power by utilities at their avoided 
cost. Although progress in facilitating cogeneration through 
public policy has been briefly stalled by contradictory fuel 
oil reduction measures--chiefly the restrictions on use of 
petroleum fuels in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act of 1978--this problem appears to be approaching resolution 
at the federal level. The basis for this conclusion is 
detailed in the Technical Appendix.
In California, state policy strongly supports develop­
ment of cogeneration to the full economic potential. Noting 
that cogeneration "is the most efficient means of utilizing 
fuels to produce power," Governor Brown on June 3, 1980,
set 6000 MW of cogeneration by 1990 as a goal for California's 
4/utilities.— And in a pair of unprecedented decisions, the 
California Public Utilities Commission on December 19, 1979, 
penalized PG&E $7.2 million in 1980 for that company's 
failure to pursue cogeneration as a major resource despite 
cogeneration's clear potential and repeated CPUC warnings.—  ̂
The CPUC set as reasonable goals for PG&E an additional 600 MW 
of new cogeneration by the end of 1980, achievement of which 
will cause the penalty to be lifted.—  ̂ The CPUC also found 
reasonable an additional 400 MW by the end of 1981, and 
1000 MW by the end of 1985, for a total of 2000 MW which 
could reasonably be expected to be available to PG&E as 
new plannable resources in the near term. (As of June 
1980, PG&E had no new cogeneration under contract.)
A number of estimates have been made of cogeneration 
potential for various utility service areas and various 
categories of process heat use. Unfortunately, there is no 
study that systematically considers statewide cogeneration 
potentials in all categories. Assumptions and results
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of the existing studies are presented in the Technical 
Appendix.
The EDF scenario of dependable cogeneration capacity 
which could be operating by 1992 consists of three categories—  
heavy oil recovery operations, large sites (greater than 
or equal to 7 MW), and small sites (less than 7 MW). The 
construction of the schedule for each category, and its 
justification, is described below.
Oil Field Cogeneration
According to the California Energy Commission, electrical 
capacity associated with generation production of steam for 
thermal enhanced heavy oil recovery operations in California 
could provide 2500 MW by 1991 and 9000 MW by the year 2000. 
Several cogeneration options are possible. Crude oil gasi­
fication systems and distillate-fired gas turbine systems 
would yield about 210 MW or 350 MW respectively, at each 
of four to six sites: Kern River, Midway Sunset, Belridge,
and McKittrick in Kern County; San Ardo in Monterey County;
8 /and Santa Maria in Santa Barbara County.—
A different system, consisting of small modular cogen­
eration units, is under development by Optimum Energy Develop­
ment (OED); the first such unit is planned to begin operation9 /in August 1980.- At a size of 1.3 MW each, these modular 
gas turbines are sized to replace the typical oil field 
steam boiler, and are unique in using crude oil as fuel.— ^
A contract has been signed between PG&E and OED for power 
and PG&E includes 68 MW of these units in its most recent 
supply plan.—  ̂ The potential for modular unit cogeneration 
at existing oil field sites has been estimated to be in 
the range of 2000-4000 MW.— ^
Since August 1979, when some price controls on heavy 
oil were lifted, and especially since December 1979, when 
additional decontrol was effected, a boom of major proportions
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has been underway in Kern County and other locations.— '
Even before the magnitude of this boom was apparent, 
additional cogeneration potential by 1982 in the southern 
San Joaquin Valley oil fields was expected to be 2000 MW.— '̂ 
In July 1980, the total potential at the Bakersfield 
and Kern River sites was placed at 6000 MW.— ^
In its current resource plan, PG&E includes 348 MW 
of oil field cogeneration: 68 MW in modular units, be­
ginning operation in 1981-1983, and 280 MW in one oil gasi- 
fication/gas turbine topping cycle system at Getty Oil's 
Kern River field.—  ̂ SCE's resource plan includes no oil 
field cogeneration.
The EDF scenario includes development of 1128 MW of 
oil field cogeneration by 1992. For PG&E, EDF's scenario 
follows the company plan. For SCE, EDF's scenario includes 
a 280 MW unit in 1987 and an additional 500 MW in 1986-1990, 
consisting either of a pair of 210-350 MW units or a large 
number of small modular units. Since most heavy oil re­
covery operations are located in PG&E's service area, 
involvement by SCE in oil field cogeneration would require 
wheeling arrangements between the two utilities.
Commercial and Industrial Cogeneration
The EDF scenario through 1992, for PG&E and SCE com­
bined, includes 1831 MW of new commercial and industrial 
cogeneration at large sites; i.e . , those greater than or 
equal to 7 MW, which are covered by the provisions of the 
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA). For 
sites smaller than 7 MW, the EDF scenario includes 390 MW 
for the two utilities through 1992: 185 MW for PG&E,
205 MW for SCE. The EDF scenario is based on projections 
prepared by the California Energy Commission, disaggregated 




For sites larger than or equal to 7 MW, the EDF
scenario includes 1831 MW for the two utilities through
1992: 1186 MW for PG&E, 645 MW for SCE. The scenario
is based on a statewide estimate of "financially acceptable"
industrial cogeneration prepared by Resource Planning
Associates (RPA).—  The statewide estimate is adjusted
for the service areas of PG&E and SCE according to the
relative consumption of energy by the seven industries
18 /examined by RPA.— ' A detailed discussion of EDF's esti­
mation procedure for both small and large cogeneration 
is provided in the Technical Appendix.
It should be noted that the EDF scenario covering 
PG&E includes even less cogeneration than the modest goals 
set for PG&E by the PUC, and far less for both utilities 
than their proportional share of Governor Brown's announced 
goal.
Footnotes
1/ PG&E, CFM III, Form R-4.
2J SCE,"Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
3/ The capacity equivalent of SCE's sales reducing (non­
firm) cogeneration is derived from SCE's estimate of 
its energy production
4/ Office of the Governor, State of California, Press 
Release, June 3, 1980.
5/ CPUC, Decision 91107, Decision 91109. The penalty will 
apply in 1980 and again in 1981 if PG&E does not sign 
contracts for 600 MW of cogeneration.
6/ Ibid.
7/ California Energy Commission, Looking Ahead, March 1979,
~ p. 171.
8/ Mark Henwood, "Feasibility and Economics of Cogeneration 
in California's Thermal Enhanced Oil Recovery Operations,"
-63-
Consultant Report to California Energy Commission, 
December 1978, p. 118.
9/ Personal communication with James Noe, Alpha National 
Corp., July 18, 1980.
10/ Ibid.
11/ Ibid.
12/ Estimates of potential for modular unit cogeneration at 
existing oil field sites:
(a) 2000-3000 MW-- Personal Communication with 
Richard Grix, California Energy Commission, 
December 19, 1979;
(b) 3468 MW based on 1977 production in the 
southern San Joaquin Valley oil fields--
A1 Stoddart, Optimum Energy Development (CPUC 
OH' 26/Tr. 1030-1047) .
13/ "Decontrol Signals State Oil Boom," Sacramento Bee, 
December 22, 1979, p. 1.
14/ A1 Stoddart, op. cit.
15/ Personal communication with James Noe, op. cit.
16/ PG&E, CFM III, Form R-4, op. cit.
17/ Resources Planning Associates, "The Potential for Co­
generation in California by 1985," prepared for the 
California Energy Commission, July 1978.
18/ U.S. Department of Commerce, "Annual Survey of Manu­




In their current resource plans through 1992, SCE 
and PG&E include 249 MW and 222.5 MW, respectively, of 
wind generation. —  ̂ EDF's scenario includes a total 
of 2665 MW for both utilities through 1992. Table 9 
provides a year-by-year comparison between the utilities' 
scenario and the EDF scenario.
SCE plans to begin testing two Wind Turbine Generators 
(WTGs) in 1980: a 3 MW Schachle-Bendix machine and a
500 kW Alcoa vertical-axis machine. SCE's resource plan 
shows the first WTG (3 MW nameplate, 1 MW at peak) starting 
commercial production in 1984, with additional units pro­
viding commercial power beginning in 1986.
PGocE's resource plan includes one 2.5 MW WTG in 1982, 
then a four-unit 10 MW cluster in 1985, and additional 
capacity each year from 1988-1992.
The EDF scenario includes testing of three candidate 
WTG models beginning in 1982. In 1983 two clusters or 
three clusters, totalling 20 WTGs, begin operation. For 
all WTGs added in 1982 and 1983, commercial production of 
power begins one year after initial operation, to allow 
time for testing. In 1986, the selected WTG model is de­
ployed in a small wind farm of 75 MW capacity. From 1987- 
1992, 200 MW of wind capacity are added each year.
Discussion
Several studies indicate that the available wind 
resource at high performance sites is much larger than 
would be developed under either the utilities' scenario 
or EDF's scenario. According to Klems of Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory, the "currently practical size" of the California 
wind resource is roughly equal to present statewide elec­
tricity production (about 500 x 10 ^Btu).-^ A recent
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TABLE 9
Wind Capacity in the EDF 












1981 - - - -
1982* 2.5 7.5 - - 7.5
1983* 2.5 57.5 - - 57.5
1984 2.5 57.5 3 57.5
1985 12.5 57.5 3 57.5
1986 12.5 132.5 9 132.5
1987 12.5 332.5 24 332.5
1988 22.5 532.5 54 532.5
1989 42.5 732.5 84 732.5
1990 82.5 932.5 129 932.5
1991 142.5 1132.5 189 1132.5
1992 222.5 1332.5 249 1332.5
* Capacity installed in 1982 and 1983 enters commercial 
production after one year of testing (i.e., in 1983 
and 1984 respectively).
Sources:
PG&E -- CFM III, Form R-4A, June 1980.
SCE -- "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 
1980.
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study performed for SCE concludes: "The development of a 
number of large scale wind arrays for electricity production 
in the Palm Springs-Whitewater Region is a realistic 
goal."-^ The study found that 2900 4-MW wind turbine 
generators (WTGs) could be sited in this region including 
650 4-MW WTGs in its most promising subregion.According 
to PG&E's "Montezuma Study," prospecting data already 
collected shows that two sites, one at Altamont Pass and 
another in Solano County, could support 396 2.5-MW WTGs, 
i . e ., 990 MW of wind capacity.—  ̂ Another study prepared 
for PG&E—  ̂ concluded that a wind potential of 3975 MW 
exists at non-wilderness sites.
The important question, therefore, is not the size 
of the available wind resource, but what level of wind 
capacity could be developed in the current time frame for 
supply planning. Two sets of issues are relevant:
(1) technical issues (the reliability of individual WTGs; 
performance of WTGs in clusters; and power system inter­
action of WTG arrays) and (2) site-specific deployment 
issues (e.g., competing land uses, noise, and television 
interference).
According to a PG&E expert, the technical problems8 /associated with wind are resolvable.-' However, neither 
SCE nor PG&E has adopted an optimal strategy for minimizing 
the risks of early commercial utilization for wind, a 
technology that is still undergoing development. SCE and 
PG&E each show plans to test only one megawatt-scale, 
horizontal axis WTG model,— despite the availability of 
WTGs from several major engineering companies, including 
Boeing, Hamilton Standard, and Bendix. Testing more than 
one model at once would reduce risk and cut lead times.
In addition, the utilities plan to wait until after testing 
of the first WTG model before testing small clusters of 
WTGs. This will further delay the construction of signifi­
cant arrays of WTGs.
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The EDF scenario prescribes a means of deriving 
conclusive answers to both machine reliability and cluster 
performance issues at an earlier date. It departs from the 
testing schedule of the utilities in two major respects:
1. At least three manufacturers' WTG models are 
tested simultaneously, beginning in 1982;
2. Cluster testing is initiated in 1983, overlapping 
single machine testing.
Testing more than one manufacturer's WTG enables the 
utility to conduct "fly-offs," ensuring that the model 
chosen is the most dependable and cost-effective available, 
and avoids the risk of delays in the schedule, which might 
otherwise result from the failure of a particular machine. 
Initiation of cluster testing in the year following operation 
of the first models allows for three years of operating 
experience with groups of machines prior to deployment 
of the first wind farm.
The concept of multiple-design WTG testing has been
developed by the Swedish Energy Source Development Board,
and is discussed in the Technical Appendix. Significantly,
PG&E itself appears on the verge of announcing a multiple-
design, overlapping testing program. According to a
spokesman for Hamilton Standard, PG&E has issued a request
for proposals to several WTG manufacturers.—  ̂ Under the
terms of the request, the manufacturer must be able to
supply three WTGs, the first for installation by January
31, 1982, and two more for initiation of cluster testing 11/by mid-1983.—  In mid-August, 1980, PG&E will announce 
which manufacturer(s) it has selected.— ^
Due to the possibility that delays will occur even 
under a multiple-model testing program, the EDF scenario 
is constructed in such a way that up to three years of 
delay can occur without curtailment of the total operating 
capacity included in the scenario in 1992.
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The Technical Appendix includes a more detailed 
description of the utility and EDF scenarios and an 
analysis of lead times, fabrication capacity, and other 
factors governing the pace of WTG development.
Deployment
Areas with high wind regimes, which would support 
several thousand MW, have already been surveyed, as 
discussed above. With regard to the question whether 
these areas can actually be utilized for wind power 
generation, a number of factors have been identified as 
possible impediments: television interference, hazards
to migrating birds, small aircraft navigational hazards, 
esthetic degradation, land use conflicts, and noise.
Information from both SCE and PG&E indicates that none
of these potential problems poses a constraint to the level
of development set out in the EDF scenario. For SCE,
this conclusion is supported by the findings of the Palm
Springs-Whitewater Region Study. After reviewing all the
13 /factors cited above, the study concludes that:—
--At this level of analysis there do not 
appear to be significant environmental or 
institutional issues which would impede 
turbine installation in the area.
This conclusion is supported by PG&E's discussion in the
14/AWV Energy System Proponents' Environmental Assessment,—  
which states:
Concerns that have been expressed about bird 
strikes, audible noise, and climatic and 
habitat disruption appear to have largely 
been resolved by the performance character­
istics of the MOD-O and MOD-OA machines in 
operation. The MOD-O at Sandusky, Ohio, 
operated during three nights of heavy migration 
with no evidence of bird injury. The sound 
produced by these slowly rotating machines 
is a gentle "swish" as each blade tip
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approaches the ground, but the noise at 
Sandusky is reported to be inaudible 
beyond a range of 66 feet. The potential 
for damage from a thrown blade through 
stress fracturing is recognized and can 
be minimized by creating larger ease­
ments around each machine.
PG&E notes that a wind farm might conflict with some 
land uses such as housing development but not with others 
such as cattle raising or logging. With respect to the 
overall impacts of WTGs, the company concludes: "Except
for aesthetic issues and construction impacts, their 
environmental impact would be minimal."— ^
Costs and Technical Parameters
EDF's estimates regarding costs and technical para­
meters for wind power are based entirely on figures pro­
vided by SCE and PG&E, as detailed in the Technical 
Appendix.
Footnotes
1J PG&E, "Common Forecasting Methodology--III," June 1980,
Form R-4A.
2/ SCE, "Summary of Loads and Resources," June 10, 1980.
2/ J.H. Klems, "The California Wind Energy Resource," 
prepared by Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory for the 
Department of Energy, September 1977, pp. 20, 33.
4/ Thomas Zambrano, et al., Wind Energy Assessment of the 
Palm Springs-Whitewater Region, Final Report, prepared 
by AeroVironment, Inc. for SCE, February 1980, p. 7-12.
5/ Ibid., Table 5-1, p. 5-12.
6/ PG&E, "Montezuma Power Plant Project Assessment Interim
Report," May 2, 1980, p. VII-32, (CPUC Appl. 59308/Exh. 64).
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7/ Study perforaed by Dr. Albert Miller and Richard Simon 
of San Jose State University; results reported in PG&E, 
"PG&E Electric Supply Planning Process and Current 
Supply Plan," Vol. II, pp. A-24, A-26 (prepared for 
CPUC 011-26).
8/ "As far as technological problems are concerned,...
with intensified efforts by the manufacturers that have 
sufficient resources behind them to solve problems, 
such as Boeing and others, I think the technological 
problems can be solved." (CPUC Appl. 59308/Tr 2142:26-30).
9/ SCE does plan to test a 500 kW vertical axis WTG in 
addition to the 3 MW Schachle-Bendix model; however,
SCE as yet has announced no plans to test the two-to- 
five-MW horizontal-axis WTGs offered by major manu­
facturers such as Boeing and Hamilton Standard.
10/ Personal communication with Tony Quattrochi, Senior 
Marketing Engineer, Hamilton Standard, July 24, 1980.
11/ Ibid.
12/ Ibid.
13/ Zambrano, et al. op.cit.
14/ SCE and PG&E, "Allen-Warner Valley Energy System Pro­





PG&E and SCE do not plan to build any biomass generation 
projects between 1980 and 1922, although PG&E does include in 
its current resource plan 130 MW of biomass projects owned by 
other entities. The EDF scenario through 1992 includes an add­
itional 160 MW for PG&E and 180 MW for SCE. Table 10provides 
a year-by-year breakdown of capacity under each scenario.
The 130 MW of biomass in PG&E's scenario consists of one 
50 MW and one 40 MW forestry-agricultural waste (FAW) project 
in 1981 and 1984 respectively, and one 40 MW municipal solid 
waste (MSW) project in 1984. The EDF scenario adopts 
PG&E's biomass plans through 1984, then adds four 40 MW 
forestry-agricultural waste projects in 1985-1988.
For SCE, the EDF scenario includes 140 MW of FAW projects 
(one 60 MW project in 1984; one 40 MW project each year in 
1985 and 1986), and one 40 MW municipal solid waste project in 
1986.
Discussion
The California Energy Commission estimates the maximum 
reasonable potential for MSW and FAW to be 350 MW and 500 MW 
respectively by the year 2000, and states that 120 MW and 
400 MW respectively could be installed by 1991. —^
For MSW, a 40 MW project is already planned for PG&E's 
service area. Since the counties in SCE's service area 
account for 44% of statewide municipal solid wastes, at least 
40 MW of MSW capacity should also by available to SCE. —'
Most forestry and agricultural wastes are produced in 
Northern California; therefore, the bulk of FAW capacity 
will be in PG&E's service area. Under the EDF scenario the 
amount of FAW capacity developed by PG&E and SCE is 250 MW 
and 140 MW respectively. Development of this level for SCE 
may require that some of SCE's capacity be located within
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TABLE 10












1980 - - - -
1981 50 50 - -
1982 50 50 - -
1983 50 50 - -
1984 130 130 - 60
1985 130 170 - 100
1986 130 210 - 180
1987 130 250 - 180
1988 130 290 - 180
1989 130 290 - 180
1990 130 290 - 180
1991 130 290 - 180
1992 130 290 180
Sources:
PG&E - CFM III,Form R-4A, June 1980.
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PG&E's service area; this would require wheeling arrangements 
between the two utilities.
With respect to environmental impacts, combustion of 
forestry and agricultural wastes is considered preferable 
to fossil fuel generation, since sulfur emissions are absent
3 /and particulates can be controlled using wet-stack scrubbers.-
Nor would the EDF scenario for FAW entail any added risk of
soil depletion, since the level of capacity included is
based entirely on the use of forestry and agricultural residues
4/which are presently burned or buried.—
Costs and Technical Parameters
For both HSW and FAW, EDF's cost and technical assumptions 
have been adopted from the cost of power study prepared by PG&E 
as part of its evaluation of the proposed Montezuma power plant. 
Details are provided in the Technical Appendix.
Footnotes
1/ California Energy Commission, "Comparative Evaluation of 
Nontraditional Energy Resources," Staff Report, February 
1980, p. B21, B31.
2J Inventory of biomass fuel resources by county provided 
in Stanford Research Institute, "Program Definition for 
Fuels From Biomass," prepared for the California Energy 
Commission, October 1976, Table 2, p. 12.
3/ Brian Barrette et al., "Energy From Wood," California 
EIR Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 9, May 2, 1977.
4/ Ibid. See also Stanford Research Institute, op. cit.
~ ppT 16-25. -----
5/ G.T. Skidmore, PG&E, memorandum to E.E. Hall, PG&E,
"Cost of Power Analysis for Montezuma Task Force,"
March 27, 1980 (CPUC Appl. 59308/Exh. 66).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The encouraging finding of this report is that 
if energy alternatives which are preferred under 
California energy policy are developed in reasonable 
and feasible amounts they can fully replace the AWV 
Energy System and other coal projects proposed by SCE 
and PG&E. Significantly, development of these pre­
ferred alternatives would have economic benefits 
for SCE's and PG&E's ratepayers and shareholders.
These findings are of particular importance because 
the AWV Energy System, as proposed, would have an 
unusually severe impact on majestic national trust 
lands and vital indigenous water resources. Therefore, 
the AWV Energy System faces considerable difficulties 
in obtaining necessary permits and approvals, and thus 
its reliability as a source of electricity in the pro­
jected time frame is uncertain.
Simply stated, preferred energy alternatives 
can fully match the AWV Energy System in terms of energy, 
capacity, reliability, and timeliness, without the 
adverse economic and environmental risks of that project. 
The AWV Energy System is clearly an inferior choice.
NOTE: Technical Appendices, not reproduced here, are 
available on request.
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